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ABSTRACT
Application of the General Linear Model
to the Analysis of Time Series Data,
and Philosophical Reflections
(September 1978)
Douglas Bill Coulson, A.B.
, Dartmouth College
M.S. University of Massachusetts, Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Dr. H. Swaminathan
Time series designs are considered the best class of designs
available to social scientists engaged in applied research where "true
experimental designs are not possible. However, in applied settings
it is not sufficient that a research design be technically elegant;
it is equally important that the research be politically and philo-
sophically sensitive to issues which arise within the applied re-
search setting. The purpose of this study was to examine the tech-
nical logic of time series designs as well as the efficacy of strict
experimental explanation in applied research.
Part I presented two time series procedures based on the
general linear model. Procedure one compared the degree of the curve
for the entire series with the degree of the curve for the pre- or
post-treatment curve (whichever has more points). A test statistic
using Hotelling's T was developed to determine the degree of the
polynomial. If the degree of the entire curve is the same as the
degree of the pre- or post-treatment curve then there is no evidence
for a treatment effect. On the other hand, if the degrees are
Vll
different then there is evidence that the treatment had an effect.
Procedure one requires means for data points, however, the analysis
may be carried out with considerably fewer observations than current
designs for single observations per time point.
The procedure two model developed a simultaneous test for
serial correlation and polynomial trend in single observation series.
Initially the model was developed for a first order autoregressive
scheme and a linear trend in the series. Subsequently, the model was
extended to include higher order autoregression schemes and poly-
nomial trends.
The model was tested on data generated from a first order
autoregressive scheme without linear trend. Although the model esti-
mated the autocorrelation parameters, p and y, adequately, it was
not powerful enough to detect simulated treatment effects in the
prsence of a positive autoregressive parameter. This result was
attributed to the way in which y effected the estimate of the treat-
ment effect. In spite of this limitation, procedure two is useful
when the autoregressive parameter is negative or when the researcher
is interested in examining the details of the autoregressive error
process
.
Part II of this study examined the predominant model of
explanation in applied research settings. It was argued that explicit
attempts to replace intentional or teleological concepts with causal
concepts in explaining human behavior and action resulted in a dis-
course that was cumbersome and distorting. In many instances it
Vlll
seemed more appropriate to explain an event or action by referring
to the agent's intentions rather than objective causes. An agent-
relational perspective was proposed as an alternative to the causal
perspective. Examples were given to illustrate when an event or
action is best subsumed under a particular perspective (i.e., causal
or agent-relational).
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OVERTURE
A Coat
I made my song a coat
Covered with embroideries
Out of old mythologies
From heel to throat;
But the fools caught it.
Wore it in the world's eyes
As though they'd wrought it.
Song, let them take it.
For there's more enterprise
In walking naked.
W. B. Yeats
A doctoral thesis is like a coat. Woven from ideas, it is
fashioned into an appropriate form; a form determined by idiosyncracy
,
current styles and tradition. And like the beggar's tattered tweed
jacket or the aristocrat's stylish midlength London Fog, it becomes an
external mark of social status.
So my thesis is like a coat. I have woven it and I will
wear it. But its real value does not lie in its physical properties.
I do not have a doctoral thesis. To be sure, I do. What I mean is
that the thesis expresses a constellation of relationships that go
beyond its physical properties. I think that songs are very express-
ive of relationships and I would therefore prefer to view my thesis as a
song:
I made my song a coat . .
.
And now that I am done others may steal my coat or they may think it
amusing or want it. But in any case I will always have my song.
PART I
TIME SERIES ANALYSIS
"If you knew Time as well as I do", said the Hatter, "you wouldn't talk
about wasting it. It's him".
"I don't know what you mean", said Alice.
"Of course you don't!" the Hatter said, tossing his head contemptuously.
"I dare say you never even spoke to Time!"
"Perhaps not", Alice cautiously replied, "but I know I have to beat time
when I learn music".
"Ah! That accounts for it", said the Hatter. "He won't stand beating.
Alice in Wonderland
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Time series designs hold a unique and perhaps paradoxical
position in the methodology literature. These designs are considered
the best class of designs available to social scientists engaged in
applied research where "true" experimental designs are not possible
(Campbell, 1963). However. Campbell and Stanley (1963) remark that
these designs were typical of classical nineteenth-century experimen-
tation in the physical and biological sciences; in these settings the
designs are seen as "true" rather than "quasi" experimental designs.
A contradiction is suggested by a design which can be considered either
as a true or as a quasi experimental procedure. It ma^ be possible
to reconcile this contradiction by viewing the general logic of time
series methods as fulfilling the requirements of traditional scientific
inference as well as reflecting the organization of ordinary experience.
Specifically, the general logic of time series work involves studying
the temporal contiguity of events, that is, causes and their effects.
However, no attempt will be made to deal explicitly with this apparent
duality within time series designs. Instead the technical logic of
time series is examined on the one hand, and on the other, the efficacy
of strict experimental explanation is scrutinized. A thesis divided
into two parts is presented.
In part I methods to analyze time series data are reviewed and
new methods to analyze this type of data are suggested. Currently
2most time series work in psychology employs the ARIMA models developed
by Box and Jenkins (1976) and Glass, Willson and Gottman (1975). How-
ever, recent work by Swaminathan and Algina (1977), Algina and Swamina-
than (1977) and Simonton (1977) have applied the general linear model to
the time series. Thus the purpose of part I will be to extend present
analytic procedures.
The purpose of part II is to explore the efficacy of quasi-
experimental and
-true" experimental explanation in social science.
Experimental explanation seeks causes of observed events. For example,
Campbell (1963) remarks,
The present author accepts 'true'
experimentation as the optimal model
for the interpretation of change in
causal terms, (p. 213)
Similarly Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) remark.
Causal inferences, however, are the
main objective in the experimental
method, (p. 115)
Furthermore, the causal relationships are between events . Roughly put,
events are operationalized objects, movements and behaviors. Events
are observed as "over there," or outside of us. For example, a teacher
slapping the school principal is an event which we may wish to explain.
In contrast to the experimental explanation given by the appli-
cation of causal analysis to the occurrence of events, is a type of
explanation found in philosophy (Hampshire, 1959; Winch, 1958), history
(Collingwood, 1956) and political science (Connolly, 1974; Maclntyre,
1973). Here the understanding of behavior requires an understanding
of actions; actions are composed of thoughts (Collingwood, 1956), plans
3(Miller, Galanter and Pribraum, 1960), and rules (Winch, 1958; Kovesi,
1967) such that the meaning of the action is not obvious from the obser-
vation of movements.
The central thesis in part II is that experimental demonstra-
tion of a causal relationship among "events" in the sphere of human
movements (to put it crassly) is not sufficient to compel us to accept
the explanation. Embodied in the explanation are complex sets of
social relationships and shared perspectives (Kuhn, 1962; Pitkin, 1972;
Connolly, 1974). It is the shared perspectives and relational "trusts"
that give an explanation its compelling force and not its causal ele-
gance. Such a thesis shifts the basis of what is "true" and rational
from the logic of experimental analysis to shared social rules and
meanings. To support this thesis an analysis of the term "independent
event" in experimental work and its analogue "action" in philosophy is
undertaken within the general framework of explanation, particularly
causal explanation.
In March of this year (1978) Israeli troops attacked PLO
positions in southern Lebanon along the Israeli border in response to a
terrorist attack on civilians near Tel Aviv. Prime Minister Begin of
Israel explained that he wanted a secure buffer zone at the northern
Israeli border which would prevent future PLO penetrations into Israel.
President Sadat of Egypt argued that a secure border can only be achieved
through the recognition and acceptance of that border by all involved
parties. For Sadat it was the relationships that were essential to
achieving a secure border not physical control. In an analogous way
the understanding of a social scientific problem cannot be accomplished
4by sheer external control (i.e. experimental manipulation). Explanation
in social science must embody a series of trust relationships between the
various participants and observers; a causal demonstration of relation-
ships is not sufficient to adopt an explanation (Harre and Secord, 1972).
The implication of part II is not the abandonment of causal
thinking but rather the recognition that causal thinking itself is bound
inextricably to thinkers and their context. As such, our social
scientific concepts, methods and conclusions arise out of a way of life
and thus must not be severed from these roots. This is Winch's (1958)
theme. In the largest, and currently popular frame, part II is a
quest for roots.
Part I begins with a review of the origins and development of
time series work outside as well as within the field of psychology.
This is followed by a detailed treatment of two procedures for the
analysis of single observation quasi-experimental time series designs.
Part I concludes with a section summarizing the requirements and circum-
stances which obtain in order to apply time series designs in research
settings.
Between part I and part II is a "buffer" chapter. The purpose
of this chapter is to facilitate the transition from technical considera-
tions of a particular statistical design to philosophical considerations
of explanation in social science.
Part II begins with a review of the "covering law" model of
explanation (Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948; Dray, 1957) and the notion of
"event" in social scientific explanation. Collingwood (1956) provides
a basis for working out a distinction between "event" and "action".
5Part II concludes by examining the implications of a relational or inter-
active perspective for social scientific explanation. The relational
perspective is derived from a consideration of the notion of "action" in
contrast to "event" in the research setting.
Finally the metaphor which unites this divided thesis is
Ouroboros, an ancient Greek snake that is eating its tail. In an
unnamed section I have hidden, like "Nina" in a New Yorker cartoon, the
explanation of how this metaphor is applied in order to encourage the
reader to read on.
CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND
Origins of Time Series Analysis
Time series analysis Is useful in several scientific disciplines,
particularly economics and the managerial sciences (Nelson, 1973; Box
and Jenkins, 1976). Recent works by Glass, Willson and Gottman (1975).
and Hersen and Barlow (1976) have applied statistical time series models
to research problems in psychology. However, procedures for studying
data over time have existed for a long time; Campbell (1963) points out
that time series methods were the classic designs for 19th century physi-
cal sciences. Moreover, statistical methods are relatively recent
developments in the analysis of time series. Yule (1926) conceptualized
the series as a function of separate and independent shocks. His work in
analyzing the occurrence of sun spots during the 18th century is one of
the earliest applications of the so called moving average models which are
discussed later. Perhaps the most steady development of these proce-
dures has been achieved in econometrics and business forecasting.
In economics and business the generic problem is forecasting.
Economic and managerial forecasting is studied in finance, marketing,
operations research, business economics, public administration and pro-
duction. Forecasting such quantities as quality of production require
that data be examined over time.
One of the earliest methods involved plotting averages on charts
(Shewhart, 1931). Charting averages of some production quantity as a
6
function of tiine provided a simple technique for illustrating business
cycles, trends, and in general the state of the company.
While charting techniques are still practiced, more quantita-
tively sophisticated methods captured the interest of academics and
more theoretically minded forecasting managers. The earliest quanti-
tative approaches applied the correlational and regression work of
Pearson and others. For example, Shewhart (1931) studied quality
control processes. One of the time series procedures involved plot-
ting the production process as a function of time. The process was
assumed to be linear through time and a standard error of measurement
was calculated. This statistic was then used to form a confidence
band along the series. A data point falling outside of this band was
indicative of a change in the behavior of the series, possibly indicat-
ing trouble as illustrated in Figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1. Percentage of defects
(from Shewhart, 1931, p. 413.)
8This is essentially a charting technique that uses a few additional
statistics beyond the arithmetic mean.
Other early time series techniques may be extracted from
textbooks on correlational analysis. Ezekiel (1930) fits regression
curves to set off different bivariate situations. In one of these
situations the variable on the absissa is time. The statistics of
interest would be the correlation coefficient (proportion of explained
variance)
,
regression coefficient (amount of change) and the standard
error of estimate (the accuracy of estimate). However, a major prob-
lem with these regression techniques is created by the non-independence
of observations. Early investigators tended to under-estimate the
importance of this problem. For example, Ezekiel (1930) remarked,
Although questions may be raised
as to how closely the prices in
successive months of a staple
commodity are really independent
of one another, there is no ques-
tion but that conditions are con-
stantly changing, so that there
are some elements of independence
between successive observations,
(p. 326)
While the biasing impact of serial dependency has been recognized for a
long time (Yule, 1926), it has only been recently that it has been dealt
with systematically (Brown, 1963; Nelson, 1973; Box and Jenkins, 1976
and Glass, Willson and Gottman, 1975).
Serial dependency may be analyzed by fitting a mathematical
model to the time series. This fitting process results in an esti-
mate of the number of parameters and their numerical values
.
There are two basic types of mathematical models: deterministic
9
and stochastic (Box and Jenkins. 1976) . A deterMnlstlc
.odel Is a
^.the^tlcal function that Iso^^hlcally describes the relationship
between two variables. For exa^le, a trajectory of a ^ssUe Is tl^
dependent and he described with great accuracy by a ^the^tlcal
function.
Unfortunately, there is probably no phenomenon that is com-
pletely deterministic including the path of a missile. Thus, we must
use a type of model that specifies the probability of a future value
lying between two specified limits. Models that specify a probability
structure for the series of observations are called stochastic models.
Ihis thesis deals with stochastic models, specifically discrete stochas-
tic models. While the data may be measured on a continuous scale, the
time series models are discrete. It must be kept in mind that the
data is studied as a function of discrete, equally spaced points in time.
That is, the operator, time, is discrete.
Box and Jenkins (1976) present three approaches for analyzing
a time series: via the autocovariance function, periodograms and the
spectral density function. The main focus here will be on the auto-
covariance function; the periodogram and the spectral density function
are briefly described.
Schuster (1898) developed the periodogram to detect and esti-
mate the amplitude of a sine component of known frequency buried in
noise. More recently the periodogram has been used to check the random-
ness of a series of residuals (Box and Jenkins, 1976). By relaxing
the assumption that the frequencies are harmonics of the fundamental fre-
quency 1/N, the sample spectrum function may be defined. This sample
10
spectrum is another way of analyzing a ti« series by using sine or cosine
waves buried in noise.
The spectrum function and the autocovariance function are
mathematically equivalent. Thus, as Box and Jenkins (1976) point out,
the advantages /disadvantages of these functions are due to their repre-
sentational values rather than their mathematical properties. Specifi-
cally, the spectrum indicates which frequencies are present in the series
whereas the autocovariance function shows how successive observations in
the series are related.
The autocovariance function is a central concept to the general
class of discrete linear stochastic models referred to as the ARIMA (auto-
regressive integrated moving average) models. A particular ARIMA
model is identified by examining the autocovariance function. The ARIMA
models are widely used in psychology and thus we will postpone a dis-
cussion of the autocovariance function until the next section where we
discuss the development of time series analysis in psychology.
Development of Time-Series Analysis in Psychology
Two major traditions within psychology have contributed signif-
icantly to the development of time series analysis and, ironically, the
two traditions are quite different in their methods of examining phenome-
na. The earliest procedures came from the operant tradition which
emphasizes experimental control of responses of an individual organism
(Sidman, 1960). While procedures that grew out of the second tradition
also studied individual cases, the tradition was tied to classical
statistical designs (Campbell and Stanley, 1963). Consequently, the
11
latter procedures emphasize statistical hypothesis testing as the basis
of inference instead of "eyeballing" the behavior of the series.
Hersen and Barlow (1976) provide an excellent historical per-
spective on single case analysis in operant research. While their
chapter is on single case designs not time series £er se, it is fre-
quently the case that a single case design is a time series. That is,
the behavior of a single organism or indicator is studied as a function
of time. They also point out that early researchers in psychology
such as Fechner, Wundt and Tichener focused on individual cases.
Specifically they studied within subject variability in an attempt to
discover general laws which would be applicable across individuals.
These methods of investigating single cases in order to discover "ideal"
response patterns which followed general laws became known as structural
methods.
Eventually the methods of these structuralists were over-
shadowed by analyses of individual differences which required that data
be aggregated over individuals. General laws were sought by studying
group or average characteristics rather than the behavior of a single
organism. Analysis of variance developed by R. A. Fisher (see Fisher,
1935) in the 1920 's became the major analytical tool to experimentally
study group characteristics; indeed analysis of variance became the
major analytical tool. The methodological Zeitgeist through the 50 's
was group comparisons via statistical hypothesis testing and estimation.
Hersen and Barlow (1976) point out that there were very few papers dur-
ing the 1950's defending the study of the single case (Beck, 1953;
Rosenzweig, 1951)
. The notable exception to a group comparison
12
approach is the work of B. F. Skinner.
Before reviewing the operant time series techniques, one other
related research method needs to be mentioned. This method grew out
of 19th century clinical practice and became known as the case study
method. Unlike operant techniques, the case study approach is non-
experimental and formed the basis for much of the psychotherapy research.
While case study research required careful and detailed observations, it
did not adhere to the inferential requirements of experimental work
(e.g., control groups and random sampling). Consequently many
applied researchers sought other techniques.
Operant techniques were developed in the context of the
ubiquitous analysis of variance and the requirements of experimental
logic. Sidman (1960) gives a comprehensive discussion of single sub-
ject research. He criticizes group comparisons and presents single
subject designs as experimentally sound alternatives to analysis of
variance techniques. Of concern here are those operant designs which
examine behavior as a function of time.
The basic operant time series design consists of two phases:
baseline data (A) on the organism and data collected after the inter-
vention or experimental manipulation (B) . Several A-B patterns are
illustrated in figure 2.2. In this figure the absissa is time and the
ordinate is rate of behavior.
These diagrams illustrate various possible changes in slope
and level as a function of the experimental manipulation which is
represented by the dotted vertical line.
More complex operant designs involve reversal shifts which
13
Figure 2.2 Patterns of data of A-B operant time-series
design (from Hersen and Barlow, 1976, p.280-
281).
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atten^t to negate the effect of the manipulation and then reinstitute the
treatment. These A-B-A-B designs set up the subject as its own con-
trol and permit broader generalizations about the manipulation over time.
At the most general level, two approaches are used to analyze
these designs: the "eyeballing" approach and the statistical approach.
The "eyeballing" approach requires that the data show obvious changes
over time and that these changes coincide with the manipulation. In
such Instances the eyeballed inference is obvious and if it is not
obvious then the experiment did not achieve sufficient control of the
variables (Sidman, 1960). Within the statistical approach there are
several alternatives which include t-tests, analysis of variance,
stochastic models and general linear models. While the subject of
this thesis deals with the statistical approaches, particularly the
general linear models, not all researchers endorse the statistical
approach.
In fact some writers in the operant literature are adamantly
against any sort of statistical analysis of behavioral data. For
example, Michael (1974) makes this comment about autoregressive models,
...their [autoregressive techniques]
understanding will surely require a good
deal of graduate instruction time and
their proper usage could easily become a
main concern from the point of view of
data analysis—clearly a case of the
tail wagging the dog. (p. 652)
Part of Michael's objection to the use of statistical techniques con-
cerns the substitution of statistical significance for significance
determined by expert judgment. If the experimental variable were pro-
perly controlled then statistical significance would be trivial and
15
expert judgments of significance unequivocal.
However, sheer reliance on "eyeballing" assumes that sufficient
experimental control may be obtained in order to support such inferences.
In many situations it is not possible to achieve this experimental con-
trol. Furthermore, statistical techniques are grounded in probability
theory. The application of probability theory to statistical computa-
tion permits the researcher to determine how "rare" or "common" an event
is. Often the probabilities of various events are not obvious and one
has to go beyond the "eyeballing" techniques to find them. Finally
good statistical practice does not rely on statistical significance as
heavily as Michael (1974) implies.
The position here is that eyeballing is a reasonable method
of analyzing time series data and should not be neglected. Most stan-
dard textbooks on data analysis recommend graphing time series data
(Ezekiel, 1930; Ezekiel and Fox, 1959; Box and Jenkins, 1976; Glass
et al.
,
1975). Charting time-series data is an eyeballing technique.
However, the application of statistical models to time series data adds
analytical power which can go beyond the power of the unaided eye.
For example, it would be very difficult to identify a time series as
stationary in its second order differences. In the following section
we review the alternatives within the statistical approach, pointing
out the shortcomings of some approaches (e.g., t-tests) and emphasizing
other approaches (e.g., ARIMA models and general linear model).
Analysis of Time-Series Data in Psychology
Early statistical approaches for analyzing time-series data
16
.ance
have involved curve fitting (Mood. 1950) and analysis of varl
(Shine and Bower, 1971; Gentile. Roden and Klein. 1972). The use of
t-tests are not appropriate because, among other reasons, they do not
take into account the behavior of the data over time. For example,
a t-test on graph 8 in figure 2.2 would not yield a significant result
though the Intervention had a clear effect. On the other hand a t-
test on graph 6 In figure 2.2 would yield a significant result though
the Intervention had no Impact on the growth curve.
Mood (1950) recommends fitting a regression line to the pre-
treatment means, Oi - 0,. This fitted curve Is then extrapolated to
time five where a confidence Interval Is constructed around the pre-
dicted point. If the observed mean, O5, falls outside of the confi-
dence region then a treatment effect Is Inferred. However. Campbell
and Stanley (1963) point out that this procedure would not be appropri-
ate when a continuous Improvement Is hypothesized. They suggest that
the researcher compare the Intercepts and slopes of the pre- and post-
treatment regression lines. If the slopes and Intercepts are Identical
then It Is concluded that the treatment had no effect. As noted by
Mood (1950), Campbell and Stanley (1963), Swamlnathan and Alglna (1977),
and Slmonton (1977), these procedures do not take Into account the
dependence among the repeated observations In the series nor do they
handle observations that lie on a curve Instead of a straight line.
Shine and Bower (1971), and Gentile, Roden and Klein (1972)
develop analysis of variance procedures that may be used for single
subjects. Gentile et al. (1972) recommend a fixed-effect-one-way ANOVA
where trials within conditions (A-B-A-B) are considered replications.
17
The error term Is calculated from trials within the collapsed A and B
cells. These data are assumed to be statistically independent and
normally distributed about the treatment means.
The major difficulty with the procedure recommended by Gen-
tile et al. (1972) is that the independence assumption concerning the
data from trial to trial is not tenable; trial data are usually seri-
ally dependent. A positively biased F-test results from the arti-
ficially lower variability produced by the non-independence of the
data. Some writers (see Glass, Willson and Gottman, 1975) have esti-
inated that a
.3 serial correlation may bias a .90 confidence interval
by 20 percent. Shine and Bower (1971) and Shine (1973) recommend
specific tests of independence before the ANOVA model is applied.
However, their recommendations do not overcome the fact that trial
data are usually serially dependent.
In order to handle the serial dependency in the data more
complicated stochastic models, such as the ARIMA models, are required.
Box and Jenkins (1976) developed these discrete linear stochastic models
and Glass, Willson and Gottman (1975) applied them to research problems
in evaluation and psychology. These models provide a function that
relates a given observation in the sequence to previous observations.
Specifically, if is a sequence of random variables measured at times
t=0,l,2 and e^ is the error associated with the variable Z^., the
most general linear stochastic models, which expresses the relationship
of Z^ to its predecessors, can be written as
[2.1] f(B)V^Z^ = g(B)e^,
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where B and V are linear operators such that
and the functions f(B) and g(B) are defined as
f(B) = 1-((.,B-(}>2B^ -
... -4, bP
P
g(B) = l-0iB-02B^ -
... -0
q
Equation [2.1] represents an autoregressive integrated moving average
(ARIMA) model of order (p, d, q) , where the nominal parameter p
refers to the autoregressive terms, d to the degree of differencing
necessary to make the series stationary, and q to the moving average
terms
.
One of the simplest models, ARIMA (1, 0, 0) is written,
12. 2] = <|)iZ^_^ + e^..
This model is similar in form to a regression model with one independent
variable. In the case here the observation at time t is a function of
the immediately preceding observation.
In order to determine which of the specific ARIMA models apply,
the autocorrelation function from the data is plotted in a correlogram.
Each model [e.g.: (1, 0, 0); (0, 0, 1); (0, 1, 1); etc.] implies a
different form for the autocorrelation function. For example, the auto-
correlation function for ARIMA (1, 0, 0) decays exponentially across lags
whereas for ARIMA (0, 0, 1) it drops to zero after lag one. Lag refers
to the "distance" back in the series that the observation at time t is
paired with. A lag one autocorrelation is the correlation between
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and
Z^_^; a lag two autocorrelation Is the correlation between Z
^e autocorrelation function is the plot of the autocorreLtions
across lags.
The model in equation [2.2] may be expanded to include an
intervention parameter. A simple transformation applied recursively
to [2.2] removes the error dependency due to the presence of ^. The
recursive transformation results in a linear model that may be^^timated
using least squares and maximum likelihood procedures.
While the ARIMA models have a broad range of applicability,
they have two major drawbacks. First, in order to get a stable esti-
mate of the autocorrelation function at least 50 and preferably 100
observations are required. Second, the approach is essentially a two-
stage procedure which requires the estimation of the parameters in the
ARIMA model, and then treating these estimated parameters as known quan-
tities in order to estimate the effect of the intervention (Glass et al.
1975, p. 85 and p. 158). The bias introduced in the estimates of the
intervention effects when the estimates of the parameters of the stoch-
astic model are treated as constants is not known and needs to be
investigated. This second point is expanded in Chapter IV.
A second approach developed by Simonton (1977), Swaminathan
and Algina (1977), Algina and Swaminathan (1977) within the framework of
the general linear model avoids these problems. Simonton (1977) dis-
cussed a procedure for comparing fitted straight lines through the pre-
and post-treatment set of points under the assumption that the observa-
tions follow a first-order auto-regressive scheme. On the other hand.
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a com-
the procedure outlined by Swaminathan and Algina (1977) involves
parison of the regression curves fitted to the pre- and post-treatinent
set of observations. These authors have shown that under general con-
ditions, i.e., that the variance
-covariance matrix of the observations
is unrestricted, the test statistic has an exact F distribution.
The procedures presented in Swaminathan and Algina (1977)
assume that the pre-treatment and the post-treatment regression curves
are polynomials of degree r-1, i.e., for the pre-treatment observation
vector xl = [xiX2 ... x^] and for the post-treatment observation vector
[2.3] Xl = Pi3i + e^i,
X2 = P262 + 62
where 81 and 62 are the (rxl) vectors of pre-treatment and post-treat-
ment regression weights, and ei and 62 are the error vectors. If the
observations are made at times ti , t2 .... t ^ , the elements pip+q ij
and P2^j of the (pxr) and (qxr) matrices pi and P2 respectively are
defined as
p,.. = t^
and
^lii i = 1, . . . . , p; j * 0, 1, ... , r - 1
f2-6]
p2jLj ? t|, i = p=l, . . . . , q; j = 0, 1, . . . .,
r-1.
The treatment effect is defined in terms of the regression weights, i.e
if
[2.7] ii = 32
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then it can be concluded that the regression curves are identical and
hence that there is no evidence of a treatment effect.
Before the regression coefficients may be estimated and
tested, the adequacy of the polynomial representation must be estab-
lished. The establishment of the degree of the polynomial represen-
tation in itself may permit an inference about a treatment effect in
some areas. That is, by definition, a treatment effect would be
inferred if the pre-treatment and post-treatment curves are of differ-
ent degrees. Swaminathan and Algina (1977) provide a procedure for
determining the degree of the pre-treatment and post-treatment curves.
However, as pointed out by the above authors, a problem
arises if either the number of pre-treatment observations p, or the
number of post-treatment observations q, is less than r - 1. For
example, if the degree of the polynomial that fits the post-treatment
set of observations is four and if the number of pre-treatment obser-
vations is four, then, since a curve of at most degree three can be
made to fit the pre-treatment set of points, a treatment effect may be
erroneously inferred. Swaminathan and Algina (1977) point out that
this difficulty may be overcome by constructing a confidence band for
the curve (pre or post) that has the larger number of observations.
This confidence band is then extended to the other set of observations
in order to see if the means for this second set lie within the confi-
dence band. However, as these authors also point out, their procedure
is not entirely adequate since the constructed confidence band is valid
only for the section of the curve for which it was constructed and not
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for the extrapolated points. Swaminathan
, Coulson and Algina (1977)
have developed a procedure that overcoines these difficulties. This is
accomplished by comparing the degree of the entire curve to that of the
pre- or post-treatment curve (whichever has more points) instead of
comparing the pre-treatment curve with the post-treatment curve. The
added advantage is that the comparison recommended here results in a
simpler procedure than the one given by Swaminathan and Algina (1977),
when the exact form of the regression curve is not important. This
procedure is presented in Chapter III.
CHAPTER III
Inferring Treatment Effects in Time Series Designs
Procedure One
Introduction
The procedure described in this chapter was developed as an
alternative to constructing confidence intervals when the number of pre-
treatment (p) or post- treatment (q) observations is less than the degree
of the polynomial (r-1) fitted to these curves. As was pointed out in
Chapter II a polynomial of, for example, degree four may fit the post-
treatment curve. If there are only four pre- treatment data points then
the highest degree polynomial that could fit these four points would be
three. In these circumstances a treatment effect would be inferred
because the pre-treatment and post- treatment curves would be polynomials
of different orders. However, the inference may not be due to the treat-
ment because the difference in the order of the polynomials may be due to
the fact that the number of observations for one of the curves is less
than the order of the appropriate polynomial.
Swaminathan and Algina (1977) recommend constructing a confid-
ence band for the curve with the larger number of points. The confidence
band is then extended into the region of the other curve in order to see
if the means for this second set lie within the confidence band. Unfor-
tunately the inference in this case is based on extrapolation and
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therefore may be inappropriate.
The procedure developed In this chapter avoids these difficul-
ties. Specifically, the degree of the entire curve Is compared to the
degree of the pre- or post-treatment curve (whichever has more points)
instead of comparing the pre-treatment curve with the post-treatment
curve. The procedure described here is easier to use than the one
given by Swaminathan and Alglna (1977). Because this procedure does
not test the exact form of the curves (i.e., = B,) , it Is only appro-
priate when the exact form of the regression curve is not of Interest.
Procedure
The procedure is based on the result that if r-1 is the same
for the curve of the pre-treatment (or post-treatment) data points and
the curve of all the data points (pre and post), then the curves are
identical. In order to see this, let the pre- (or post-) treatment
curve be given by
f^-lJ y = a + ai X + a2 x2 + ... + a v
and the entire curve be given by
r3.2] y' = b + bi X + b2 x2 + ... + b , x'^"^o '- r-l
Let x^ be a point common to both curves. In this case we know that v
o
y'^ because the total curve includes the pre- (or post-) treatment curve
Then from [3.1] and [3.2] we have
,
[3.3] y^ - y'^ = 0 = (a^ - b^) + (ai - bj) x^ + (a2 - b2) x^^
^ ^Vl - \-l> -o"'
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Since equation [3.3] is identically equal to zero for all values of x^,
= b^. Thus, if the degree of the pre- (or post) treatment curve L
equal to the degree of the curve that passes through all the points, the
curves must be identical.
In order to infer a treatment effect we tested the hypothesis
that the degree of the curve that fits the pre-treatment (or post-
treatment) set of means is the same as the degree of the curve that fits
the entire set of means. This hypothesis can be conveniently stated
as two sets of hypotheses:
1. a (r-l)th degree polynomial fits the pre-treatment or post-
treatment set of observations, whichever set has more observa-
tions
.
2. a (r-l)th degree polynomial fits the entire set of points.
If both of these hypotheses are accepted then we can conclude that the
pre-treatment and post-treatment regression curves are of the same degree,
which in turn implies that the two regression curves are identical.
Thus, acceptance of the hypotheses above implies that the treatment was
not effective, while the rejection of one of them (i.e., the hypothesis
on the pre- or post-treatment curve) implies that the treatment was
effective. However, if it happens that both hypotheses are rejected,
then it has to be taken that the polynomial representation is not ade-
quate. In this case, (r-1) is incremented by one, and the hypotheses
tested again.
In general, the hypothesis that a curve of degree (r-1) fits a
set of means where the means are obtained on the same group of individuals,
can be stated as
26
[3.4] C y = 0
m —m —
where is a (mxl) vector of .eans
, and is a (.-rx.)
.atrix of con-
stants. For instance, C matrix appropriate to testing the hypothesis
that a curve of degree two fits a set of six means, is
'6 -
1-3 3-1 0 0
0 1-3 3-1 0
0 0 1-3 3-1
m
If the degree of the polynomial is r-1, then C_ is defined
[3.5]
as
m
a_ o^
o a
. o
£ . . . . a_
where the elements of the (lxr4-l) vector a are the coefficients in the
expansion of (1-x)^.
The appropriate statistic for testing the hypothesis given by
Equation 4 under the assumption of multivariate normality and indepen-
dence of the vectors xi •••2^^' known (Morrison, 1967, pp.120),
and is given by
[3.6]
T 2 = n X' C (C S C ) X
,m — m m m m m—
m
where
_X^ is the mean vector, and the sample dispersion matrix is given
by
[3.7]
= (n-1)"^ E (X, - X ) (X, - X )•
k=l
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It is well known that when given by [3.4] Is true, the quan-
tity
t3.8] = {(m-r) (n-1) } {n
-(m-r) } T 2
m
has the F distribution with degrees of freedom (m-r) and n-(m-r).
In order to test the hypothesis that a curve of degree (r-1)
fits the pre-treatment or the post-treatment means, we take m = p or q,
whichever is larger. In order to test the hypothesis that a curve of
degree (r-1) fits the entire set of points, we take m = p+q. The test
statistic for each of these values of m can be obtained readily from
Equations 3.6 and 3.8.
The initial choice of the degree of the polynomial, r-1, is
arbitrary. Its value may be guessed by plotting the means, or other-
wise, it is set equal to one and incremented until the fit is deemed
adequate
.
Example
The multivariate data generated by Swaminathan and Algina
(1977) to simulate nine pre-treatment observations and six post-treatment
observations on N=40 subjects are reanalyzed using the procedure outlined
here. The pre-treatment mean vector Xi and post- treatment mean vector
, are given below
Xi = [19.8 .29.9 38.1 43.4 48.1 50.0 51.8 52.1 52.4]
X2 = [52.3 52.5 53.1 54.1 57.5 61.0]
The (15x15) sample variance-covariance matrix of the entire set of obser-
vation is not reported for lack of space and may be obtained from the
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authors on request.
Polynomials of different degrees, starting with r=l were
fitted for the pre-treat.ent of pre/post (total) treatment means
until degrees of the polynomials were determined. The results of the
analysis are given In Table 3.1. The results show that curves of
degree three adequately describe the pre-treatment set of observations
Table 3.1
Analysis of Quasi-experimental Time-series Data
p=9 q=6 N=40
t2
IZILIL "^'i^^''^^-' ^^-Srees of Preedom
Pre
Tr-ZIT . -r ,
Treatment Total Treatment TotalTreatment Total Curve Curve Curve CurveCurve p-r,n-(p-r) (p+q,n-(p+q-r)
1 4677.38 5727.39 7, 33 13, 27 565.40 305.01
2 108.03 3129.17 6, 34 12. 28 15.70 187.22
3 10.08 17.57 5, 35 11. 29 1.81 1.19
and the entire set of observations. We thus conclude that the pre-
and post-treatment regression curves are identical and hence infer that
the treatment was not effective.
CHAPTER IV
Analysis of Single Observation Quasi-experimental
Time Series Designs
Procedure Two
Introduction
In this chapter a method is presented for analyzing single
observation time series data. With the exception of Glass. Willson
and Gottman (1975). recent work done on time series analysis require
that the number of subjects exceed the total number of time points.
For example. Algina and Swaminathan (1977) and Swaminathan and
Algina (1977) have outlined procedures which take into account the non-
independence of the observations, and are formulated to facilitate the
comparison of pre- treatment and post-treatment regression curves. If
these curves are identical, i.e.. if the pre-treatment and post-treatment
sets of regression coefficients are equal, then the hypothesis of a
treatment effect is not tenable. Simonton (1977) outlined a similar
procedure for comparing the pre- and post-treatment regression curves
when they are straight lines and when the errors follow a first order
autoregressive scheme. While these procedures employ well known results
from multivariate statistics, they require more subjects than time points.
Glass, et. al. (1975) have applied the ARIMA models (see Box
and Jenkins. 1976) to the analysis of psychological and educational time
series data. These models are appropriate for single subject time series
or in general when the number of time points exceeds the number of
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subjects. However, these procedures have several drawbacks which stem
from a two stage estimation procedure. Specifically, after a particu-
lar ARIMA model Is Identified, say first order autoregresslve
, the
parameters of this Identified model are estimated through a maximum like-
lihood estimation procedure. In the second stage these estimated
parameters are treated as constants in order to estimate a second set of
parameters associated with the level of the series (L) and the interven-
tion effect (6). By treating the first set of estimated parameters as
constants the effect of sampling errors are ignored. Unfortunately
these sampling fluctuations introduce an unknown amount of bias into the
second set of estimates. As a consequence of this unspecified bias
created by the two stage estimation procedure, several difficulties
arise. For example, the distribution of b in the model that contains
the level and intervention parameters (L, 6] will not be multivariate
normal. These difficulties are discussed in more detail at the end of
this chapter.
In the model presented below a simultaneous test for serial
correlation and polynomial trend is developed. This simultaneous test-
ing procedure gives estimates in a single stage and thereby avoids the
concomitant problems of the two-stage procedure associated with the ARIMA
models. Furthermore this model also may be used for the analysis of
single observation time series designs. Initially the model is devel-
oped for a first order autoregresslon scheme and a linear trend in the
series. Subsequently the model is extended to include higher order
autoregresslon schemes and polynomial trends.
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The Model
The single unit (subject, group, etc.) time series design with
P pre-treat.ent observations and q post- treatment observations made at
times ti,t9,...tt «.
^
^ P P+1* p+q* represented as
!
P
Zl, 22, ...» 2^ I Z ....z ^ ,p+1 p+q
'
where the division in the series between and z^^^ represents an
experimental manipulation. We shall assume that the pre-treatment and
post-treatment observations lie on straight lines, i.e..
[A. la]
and
[A. lb]
z «
^01 + 3ii t^ + e^. n = 1, p
e02 + ei2 + e^, n = p+1, p+q.
The regression coefficients, 3oi and Bnare the intercept and slope
parameters for the pre-treatment regression line while the coefficients,
eo2 and $12, correspond to the post-treatment regression line. Follow-
ing Algina and Swaminathan (1977), Simonton (1977). and Swaminathan and
Algina (1977), we define a treatment effect in terms of the regression
coefficients. If
[A. 2] H :
o
^01 302
3ii 3i2
is accepted, then it can be assumed that the hypothesis of a treatment
effect is not tenable.
The procedure for estimating the parameters in the model [A.l]
as outlined by Swaminathan and Algina (1977) is clearly not valid since
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there is only one observation per time point. Following Simonton
(1977) and Glass et. al. (1975), we assume that the errors, e^
serially dependent according to a first-order auto-regress-
ive scheme, i.e.
[A. 3] e_ = pe
n-1
+ e
n
with |p|<l to ensure stationarity (see Appendix A and Glass et. al.
,
1975, for a discussion). The quantities are disturbances that are
independently and identically distributed with mean 0 and variance a^.
If we further assume that is normal, an assumption that is necessary
for testing hypotheses, and that e are independent of e
, then itH J.
can be shown that
[4.4] e^^ n [0, a2].
where a
- /(l-p^). Furthermore it is well known (see Appendix A
for details) that the covariance between e and
n+k, E(e^
^n+k^ ' given
by
Thus, the variance-covariance matrix, Z, of the vector of errors,
= [ei , e2 , . .
.
, e
, ... e
[4.5]
'p+q] is given by
1 p p^ . . .
p 1 p . . .
P 1 . . .
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In order to facilitate further development. „e need the following result,
given by Ogawara (1953) and Krlshnalah and Murthy (1966)
;
I!!eorea: Let (x^) be a sequence of normally distributed random varia-
bles such that
where
such that
and
E(e^) = 0,
Then, the conditional random variables {x2jx2^_^, x
^^^}, are independ-
ently and identically normally distributed with mean
[4.6] E(x,Jxa„.^, x,„,,) = - l(p,^_^
. P3_^^p ^ lu^^^ ^
where y = 2p/(l+p2)^ variance
f^-^^
''2^,''2^.V %+l = <^^(l-P^)/(l+p2) = a*2
Proof: The independence of x^Jx^^,^, x^^^^ and ^z^,^]^!^,^ ^2^_^
follows immediately since it is well known that xo and xo ^ are inde-
n
pendent if X2^_^ is held constant (Morrison, 1976, p. 138). In order to
derive [4.6] and [4.7], let
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and
a2 a2p2
^21^22
The eleioents of Z follow directly from the results given in Appendix A.
For example, entry a^p^ is the covariance of X2^_^ and Xi^^y These
observations are two lags apart. Similarly the entry in row one,
column three is the covariance of and X^^,^^. These observations
are adjacent and thus the lag is one and the covariance is a2p.
Since
X N (j£,E)
,
it follows (See Anderson, 1958, p. 28) that
E(x2^|x2) = + (X2 - y2)222 ^12
Now
Hence
,
Z"^ a 12 =^P/(1+P^)} [1 1]
22 -
E(X2JX2) = + {p/(l+p2)} {(X2^_^ -
y2^.i) + (X2 " y2 . J)
- I
n 2 ^^2n-l + %-Hi) (^2^-1^^2^+l>-
Similarly, it follows that
"^2n- ^2„-r ^2^+1 = -2-12 ^22 %2
= a2(l-p2)/(i+p2) =
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In order to apply the above theorem to estimate the parameters
in the model given by Equations [4.1a] and 14.1b], we write
^ - POI + eiit^. n - 1, .... p,
\ - 3o2 + 6l2tj^. n = p+1, p+q.
Then, since
+ e*
n,
it follows that for the pre-treatment set of observations,
[4.8]
"2nl"2„-r ^2^+1 = eoi (1-Y) + en [t^^ -
^
(t^^_^ + t^^^^)]
and, for the post-treatment observations,
14.9]
^^n\^^n-V ^2^+1 - Bo2(l-Y) -f 3i2 [t2^ - \ (t^^,^ + t,^^^)]
2 ^n-1 ^n+1 2ji»
where ^e*^}
,
are independently and identically distributed. If we fur-
ther assune that observations are made at equally spaced time points, and
set
aoi = 3oi (1-y)
cil • 3li (1-y)
ao2 • 3q2 (1-y)
"12 " 3i2 (1-y)
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and
n 2 ^n-1 ^^^j^-' ,
the models given by [4.8] and [4.9] reduce to
[4.10a]
% %-l; ^2^+1 ' ^01 + 0'll(2n) + Yz^ + e*2^,
for the pre-treatment observations, and
[4.10b]
^^n ^2n_i. Z2n+;L " °'02 + ai2(2n) + Yz' + e*2
,n •^n
for the post-treatment observations.
The model given by [4.1] is thus expressible as a conditional
model given by Equation [4.10], with the important property that the
errors, ej^, are independently and identically distributed.
Dropping the notation for the conditional model, the models
given by [4.10] can be combined to yield the model
[^.11]
, *
Nxl Nx5 5x1 Nxl
where, if p is odd and q is even,
2' = [Z2, Zp_^
[
Zp^^, Zp^^_J,
a' = [cqi ail ot02 "12 V],
«*i r * * * * * ,e . [ea ... e
^.^
| a . . e ^^^.^J .
I
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12 0 0 (2i+z3)/2
14 0 0 (23+Z5)/2
1 p-1 0 0 (z .+z )/2p-2 Tp"
0 0 1 p+1 (z +z
_^„)/2
P P+2
0 0 1 p+3
0 0 1 p+q-1 (z +z ^ )/2p+q-2 p+q
and N, the number of observations, is (p+q-1) /2.
By definition,
E(e*) = 0,
and
E(e* e*l) = a*2 I
where I is the identity matrix. Since the elements, e*^, are indepen-
dently and identically distributed, the vector a can be estimated by the
usual ordinary least squares procedure (Searle, 1971). The estimate a
of is given by
[4.12] a = (X'X)"-'-X'
Furthermore, it is well known that if e* N(0^, I), then
14.13] a Nia, (X'X) ''].
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Tests of Hypotheses
The hypothesis of no treatment effect given by Equation [4.2],
H :
o
POl
3ii
^02
3i2
can be stated In terms of the elements of a as
[4.14] H :o
°'01
an
This hypothesis together with other hypotheses of Interest may be stated
In general as
[4.15]
H :
o
a =0
rx5 5x1
where C Is full rank. For testing the hypothesis given by [4.15], C is
chosen as
[4.16]
C =
10-100
0 1 0-10
Similarly, the hypothesis, H^: p = 0, that no serial dependence among
the observations exist, can be tested as H^: y = 0. The appropriate
choice of C in this case is
[4.17]
is
[4.18]
C = [0 0 0 0 1].
The test statistic for testing the hypothesis given by [4.15]
F= (N-5) {a'C [C(X'X)~-'-C'] ^ Ca}/r " a'X'^}
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and has the F-dlstrlbutlon with r and (N-5) degrees of freedom. Thus,
the hypothesis, given by [4.15] can be accepted or rejected by cohering
the F value with the percentile points of the appropriate F-dlstrlbutlon.
Once the hypothesis given by [4.15] Is rejected. It may be of
interest to determine If there was a change due to the Intercept, slope,
or both. In order to determine this, (l-a)% confidence Intervals can
be constructed for paraiKtrlc functions of Interest. In general. If
the hypothesis
H : Ca = 0
o — —
is rejected, (l-a)% limits for the simultaneous confidence intervals of
the parametric functions a'Cb are given by
[^•19] a'Cb + {rs2 F }i
— r,N-5;a
where
s2 = (^.^ _ a'X'x)/(N-5).
Tests of Underlying Assumptions
An assumption that was made in developing the statistic for
testing the hypothesis of no treatment effect is that the serial depend-
ency of the observations remains the same before and after the treatment.
This assumption was made by Glass et al. (1975) and Simonton (1977).
However, it is of interest to determine if this is indeed so, since a
test of treatment effect may not be meaningful if this condition is not
met.
In order to incorporate different autoregressive error schemes,
the model for error given by Equation [4.3] has to be modified as
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[4. 20a] e = qI
and
[4.20b] e = p2 e + . n - n+i
In applying the result given by E,uatlon [A.6] to the pre-treat^nt and
post-treatn^nt observations separately. Equations [4.10a] and [4.10bl
become
[4.21a]
^2^|Z2„_i, z = aoi + aH(2n) + Y^z' + e*2^
^
for the pre-treatment observations, and
[4.21b]
, *
^2nl^2j,-l' ^2^+1 = °'02 + ai2(2n) + Y2Z: + 6 2
,
for the post-treatment observations, with
Yi = 2pi/(l + pf)
and
^2 = 2p2/(l + P2^ .
Moreover,
and
where
^<^2n,2 > = 0> E<-2n,2) = ^-P^) /d+P^) =
and
n = p+1, ...» p+q.
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Thus, the hypothesis that serial dependencies in the observa-
tions remain the saine can be tested by testing the hypotheses:
[A. 22]
and
[4.23]
H : a2
o 11
H : y-
22
In order to test these hypotheses, the linear model [4.11] is
rewritten as:
[4.24]
where
22
Xi
Q «2
L J
*
*
L. J
[«01 an ^i] ,
[4.25]
±1
Ixi(p-l)
zi =
Ixi(q-l)
[ao;
[Z2
[2
ai2
p+2 V4*** '
and
Xi
i(p-l)x3
1 2 (21+ 23)72
1 4 (23+25)72
1 p-1 (2 ,+z^)72
i(q-l)x3
1 P*1-l<Vq-2*%+,'/'
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It Should be pointed out th.t the vectors of observations,
and z,.ln Equation [4.25] are arranged differently than In Equation
"
[4.11]. Since It is not assu^d that the sa»e serial dependencies
exist within the pre-treatment and post-treat„ent observations, the
observation, z^^^, u not alloyed as the first observation In the set
of POst-treat.ent observations. This Is because. It cannot be assumed
that Zp^^ is predictable from z^, a pre-treafnent observation. This
difficulty is avoided If the first observation used Is z^^^. which Is
predictable from z^^^ and z^^j, both belonging to the post-treatment set
of observations.
Since,
and
e*i 'v> N (0 , I)
,
e*2 ^ N (0
,
I)
*.i.e., the elements of the vector e ' = [e?' e|' ] are not identically dis-
tributed, the regression vectors,
, and have to be estimated separ-
ately. However, before the vectors are estimated, the hypothesis
V ^ii = i2
is tested. Since the estimates of and a^^, s^^ and s^^, respective-
ly, are
^11 = - Xl(XlXiX"^Xi]zi}/(£^ - 3),
and
= [I - ^(^x2^~\]z^}/(^ - 3),
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it follows that sa^(p-7)/2 and sl^i^-n /Z are Independently distributed
as chl-8,uare variates with (p-7)/2 and (q-7/2 degrees of freedom, re-
spectively. Hence, the statistic for testing the hypothesis
[4.26]
H
against
Hi :
22
Is
F= sys^^
.
F(p.7)/2,(q-7)/2
•
If the hypothesis, H^: = is accepted, then it can be
assumed that the elements of the vector e* = [e*ie*2 ] are identically
distributed. However, this does not imply that pj = In order to
test this hypothesis, or, H^: = when = a^^ = a*2, we write
the model given by [4.24] as
z^'Xa + e
*
where z, X, and a are defined as previously. Since, under the assump-
tions that
^22 ' ^^*»
e* ^ N (0, a2* I),
it follows that
[4.27]
£1
a2
(X{Xi)"^Xi zi
(X2X2) X2 Z2
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and the estimate s*2 of a*2 ig g^^^^
[4.28] *2
-1
s
=
z' [I - X(X'X)--^X']z/ [^(p+q-2) - 6]
The hypothesis
[4.29]
can be stated as
H : yl = Y2
o
H : C a = 0
o — —
where
C = [0 0 1 0 0 -1].
The statistic for testing the hypothesis in [4.29] is
[4.30]
F = {a'C'[C(X'X)-lc']"^C a}/s*2 Fj, ^ , .Cp+q-2)-o
If this hypothesis is accepted, then we can conclude that the serial
dependencies in the observations remain the same before and after the
treatment.
Inferring Treatment Effects in the Presence of Polynomial Trends
The procedures outlined in the previous sections are valid
when the pre-treatment and post-treatment regression curves are straight
lines. This requirement may be unduly restrictive at times and hence
procedures that take into account polynomial trends are necessary.
Assuming that observations made at time points, tj, t2
,
t 4._ lie on a curve of degree k, the observations z made at time t can
n n
be represented as
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[4.31a]
and
"
* '"'n^^^'^ ^ - ^ ^1^' + e^. n = 1, . .
. p,
[4.31b]
where, as before, we shall assiaae that
'
"Vl + ^n* » - 1 P+q
This assumption, that the serial dependence In the observations regains
unchanged from pre-treatment to post-treatment, can be tested as Indlca-
ted in the previous section.
The results [4.6] and [4.7] cannot be directly applied to
Equation [4.31]. However, the model given in [4.31] can be reduced to
the model given in [4.1] by taking successive differences.
It is well known that if p(t) is a polynomial of degree k,
then
,
[4.32] k-1
, ,A p(t) = £ + ji t,
o 1 '
i.e., linear in t. It follows then that
k-1
^
— Sim n
and
[4.33a] A^-^ z = l^, ^H^ ^ = ^> P»
[4.33b]
A = £o2 + 5'12t^ + ^e^, n = p+1, p+q
It also follows that if
then
e = pe
, + e
,n n-1 n
n n-1 n
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k-1
since A is a linear operator. Thus, the difference. A^"^
follows the first-order autoregressive scheme if e^ follows a first-
order autoregressive scheme. Replacing A^"^ z by y . and A^'^ e by
<5„, we have
n
[4.34a]
and
[4.34b]
with
^n
' ^01 + ^11 6^, n » 1, p.
= ^02 + ^12 +6^. n = p+1, p+q.
1^-35] 6 = p6 , + e* .
n n-1 n
Thus, the model given by Equation [4.32], is equivalent to the model given
by Equation [4.10] when the observations are assumed to be made at equal
intervals, i.e., t^ = n. The procedures outlined in the previous section
are, thus, immediately applicable to the situation where a polynomial
trend is exhibited.
Test for Treatment Effect in the Presence of a hth Order Autoregressive
Scheme . ~ " —
The procedure described in the previous sections can be direct-
ly extended to the case where, the error e
, in the model [4.1] follows an
hth order autoregressive scheme, i.e.,
[4.36] e = Oi e + 02 e + ... + 0 e , + e .n ^ n-i ^ n-z h n-h n
In this case, the autocorrelation function
p^^ satisfies the Yule-Walker
equations (Kendall and Stuart, 1968)
1^-37] + 01 p^_^ + ... + 0^p^_^ = 0, i=l, 2, 0.^ 0,
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with the requirement that the roots of the equation
[4.38]
h h-1
+...+0^=0
h
lie within the unit circle, to ensure stationarity
.
As With first order autoregressive scheme, it is well known
that, in the sequence {e^}
,
the correlation between e^_^ and e^^^ par-
tialling out the effect of the intermediate observations is zer^
Thus, e^ is predictable from only the 2h adjacent response and hence,
the sequence of conditional random variables
^^n'Vh* ^n+h^ = 2(h+l), 3(h+l)...
are independently and identically distributed.
It can be shown that (Ogawara, 1953; Krishnaiah and Murthy,
1966)if t^ = n, then, for the pre-treatment observations,
Zp. with the error following a kth order autoregressive scheme.
I4.39aJ
M^l) = "01 ^ annCh^l) . \(z^(,,,)., .
^n(h.l).i>/2
^®n(h+l)' n = 1, p/(h+l).
Similarly, for the post-treatment observations,
[4.39b]
riCh+l) 12 i' n(h+l)-i ^ ^n(h+l)+i^/^
®*n(h+l)' n = P+1. (q-k)/(h+l).
The symbols z^^^^^) denotes the conditional nature of the observations.
The parameter Y^, (i=l, ... h) in the model [4.39] are functions of the
h parameters, Gj
, 02, 0^^ in the model [4.36].
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The model given by Equation [4.37]
matrix form
can be expressed in th(
[A. 40]
where
Nxl Nx(h+4) (h+4)xl Nxl
N = (p+q-h)/(h+l), and
Thus, hypothesis concernine the eff^.r>^ r.fg fect of the treatment can be stated as
^hl-
°' 2x(h+4) (h+4)xl ~ -
where
C =
10-1 0 0 ••• 0
0 1 0 -1 0 ••• 0
and tested as indicated in the previous sections. Similarly hypotheses
concerning Gj, 0^, ... 0 can be tested in terms of y., '.• v
Example
In order to test procedure two, a linear model without trend
(slope equal to zero) was applied to data generated to meet the require-
ments of this model. The model is given by.
[4.41a]
^2n = ^1+^2; + e*2n
for the pre-treatment series and
[4.41b]
for the post-treatment series.
= «02 + Y + e*^
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As before,
O'Ol = Bjj^ (1-Y)
°'02 = (1-Y)
Y = 2p/(l+p2)
n ^ ^ 2n-l ^
'^2n+l^-
Equation [4.41] is simpler to work with than the model given
by Equation [4.10] and, in essence, is identical to the models em-
ployed by Box and Jenkins (1976), and Glass et al. (1975). In this
case, the treatment effect is given by 6,, - 6^^, while the hypothesis
of no treatment effect is tested by testing the hypothesis
° 01 02
Two first order autoregressive series were generated from
a random numbers table [X 'v. N (0, 1)]. For the first series p = +.6,
and for the second series p = -.6. Each series was approximately 80
observations in length, which resulted in 40 conditioned observations,
20 for the pre-treatment series and 20 for the post-treatment series.
In order to determine if the procedure would detect group
effects four SPSS regression analyses were carried out. Two analyses
(p = .6 or p = -.6) compared agi and for the generated condition-
alized series. In the remaining two analyses each observation in the
post- treatment series was incremented by two to simulate a treatment
effect, and the hypothesis, H^: a^^ = a^^, was retested.
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In the SPSS program each case contained four variables:
treatment (pre = 0, post = 1). dependent measure (B^
, every other
observation In the original series), the two condltlonall.lng ob-
servations (Z.
, and Z ^ a ^2n-l "^Zn+V ' ^ '^°°^P"te statement combined g2n-l ^nd
^52n+l to calculate z; as given above. Finally, a regression allysis
was carried out: Z2n the dependent variable with treatment (0, 1)
and the conditional variable, z; as the independent variables. The
results of the analysis are reported in Table A.l.
The first part of the analysis was to verify that no
treatment effect was present for the original sets of data. The re-
sults indicate that this was indeed true, i.e., no significant treat-
ment differences were found for the original series (see Table A.l).
When the "post-treatment" observations were incremented by
two, a significant treatment effect was detected for the series with
P = -.6 (p < .0001). However, when p = .5, no treatment effect was
detected, indicating that a positive correlation resulted in a decrease
of power (this was found to be true even when the post-treatment ob-
servations were incremented by ten).
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Table 4.1
Analysis of Single Observation Ti.e Series Designs
Simulated Autocorrelation
Treatment Parameter Estxmates
^ff^^t (p) .
^01 - ^02
•6
.81 .51
-•6
-.85
-.56
.046
0892
•6
-81 .51
.33
•6
-.85
-.56
.0892
01 ^02
•24
.23(p<.88)
048
.010(p<.75)
1.76
.622(p<.43)
048 134. (p<. 0001)
CHAPTER V
DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The procedure outlined in Chapter in ex^. hHL ii tends previous
" —
-
......
curve is not of intere<5fx c rest, this method provides a <=-rn,T.i
,
^
^ xa simple procedure
pro...
.Ha. .
^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^
The procedure requires sequential testing of h k^^""^ °^ hypotheses which in turn
to .o« se,ue„U.l
.estin, procedures an. Hence canMon sHouH He
exercised m testing and Interpreting tHe HypotHeses.
In general. tHe ^1„ advantage of tHe tecHnl,ue outlined
here and tHe
.etHods given Hy S„a™i„atHa„ and Alglna (1977) and
SLonton (1,77) over tHe ARIM
.odels described In CHapter 11 Is
that tHey do not require 50 to 100 observations tHrougH tHe series.
This feature
.aKes tHls design extremely attractive m evaluating
the effect of a treatment on an entire classroom. However, a require-
ment of tHese multivariate models Is tHat rh. uS h t e number of subjects (N)
exceed the number of time points (P).
.ga,„, ,,,,
usually be met when entire classrooms are Involved. A further
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advantage of
.His procedure is that no restrictive assumptions
concerning the variance-covariance structure o, the observations
need to be made.
Discussion; Procedure t,.t^
In contrast to procedure one. procedure two outlined in
Chapter IV „ay he used to infer treatment effects in single case
interrupted time series designs. By splitting the original series
in half (in the case of first-order autoregressive error) it was
She™ to he possible to use the conditional distribution of alternate
Observations to give an exact test for the regression coefficients
as well as the first order autoregressive parameter. At the outset.
It may appear that dealing with only an autoregressive process and
not a moving average process Is unduly restrictive. However, as
other writers have noted (Slmonton, 1977; Glass et al.. 1,75) memory
and habit influences are characteristic of behavioral phenomena
which makes the autoregressive process a reasonable model.
Several aspects of the procedure presented in this chapter
are examined next. First, the Durbin and Watson (1950) test for
serial correlation is compared to the simultaneous test given here.
This is followed by a comparison of the overall procedure with the
methods found in Glass, Willson and Gottman (1975). Finally, the
relative advantages and disadvantages of the model presented here are
summarized.
Correlated errors creates a major difficulty for the
researcher Interested In analyzing time series data. To Ignore this
correlation one runs the risk of Introducing a serious and unknovm
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bias into the estimates and
.lg„i£i,,„«
earlier a modest serial correlation of .4 could inflate alpha by 18%.
On the other hand, to employ sophisticated statistical methods to
deal With this problem when in fact there was no correlation among the
serial errors would be foolish. Thus, a reasonable starting point
would be to test for serial correlation In the time series.
Durbln and Watson (1950) investigated the problem of testing
the error terms of a regression model for serial correlation. They
derived a d statistic calculated from the residuals which gave a
test of the hypothesis of independent errors. The statistic Is
d . £(Az)^
such that,
Az = Ay - bjAxj- ••• - bpAXp
,
and
oil
p p
For normal independent errors they obtained the upper and lower bound
for the distribution of d and tabled the percentage points (see
Durbin and Watson, 1951). Errors that have positive serial correlation
yield a relatively small d, whereas errors that have negative serial
correlations yield a relatively large d statistic. If a negative or
positive serial correlation is found the researcher would proceed to
plot the autocorrelation function following the model identification
guidelines outlined in Box and Jenkins (1976).
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The Durbin and Watson test would be cabled out before the
AKIM. models were applied U the reseatcber was uncertain about the
extent to which ebe series contained serial correlations. The re-
-Its given by Ogawara (1,53). applied 1„ the previous chapter pro-
vide an alternative to the Durbln and Watson statistic. Several
aspects of the procedure onMio^^ uP utlined here represent Improvements over
previous practices.
The most Important Improvements are that the test for serial
correlations Is exact and can be carried out simultaneously with
tests for the other parameters of Interest. That Is, the Durbln and
Watson test Indicates presence of serial correlations which must then
be followed by Identifying an ARIMA model In order to estimate the
extent of the serial correlations. Here testing tor the presence of
serial correlation and the extent of that correlation are incorpor-
ated into the same test along with the other parameters of Interest.
Another Improvement Is that the model upon which the tests
are based make It possible to compare the serial correlations of the
pre-treatment series with the serial correlations of the post-treatment
series. Often time series work In educational and psychological re-
serach Involve series that are Interrupted by a treatment. In these
Interrupted time series designs the error process may be effected by
the treatment (see Glass et al., 1975. p. 126). The Durbln and Watson
test may be used to test the similarity of the errors process in the
pre- and post-treatment series. However, this test is asymptotic
while the procedure outlined here for comparing the autocorrelation
parameters of the pre- and post-treatment series, Is explicit and
yield exact tests of significance.
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In order to Identify a particular ARIma (p.d.,) „odel the
researcher plots the autocorrelation function of the observed
series. Specific models l„ply specific autocorrelation functions.
For example a first order autoregresslve autocorrelation function
shows exponential decay after lag one. On the other hand a first
order moving average
.odel will give a theoretical autocorrelation
function Which drops to zero after lage one. By comparing the
Observed autocorrelation function with the various theortelcal func-
tions the researcher makes a decision on which
.odel seems best.
The decision Is subjective; there are no statistical procedures used
m comparing the observed and theoretical functions. The actual
identification process Is more complex than the description above.
That is. m addition to examining the behavior of the autocorrelation
function, the researcher would also plot the partial autocorrelation
function. For details the reader may consult Glass et al. (1975,
p. 92ff).
This type of identification procedure may be made more
rigorous by employing the techniques outlined here. For example, in
an earlier section in the previous chapter a test for treatment ef-
fect in the presence of a h'h order autoregresslve scheme Is given.
This test may also be used to identify the order of the autoregresslve
process. As before the hypothesis of Interest Is
H^: C6 = 0
where the vector Includes the parameters Yj to which correspond to
the higher order autoregresslve parameters S, to 0 . The matrix C
^ h
may be specified such that the null hypothesis is that the highest
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order parameter, a short sequence of tests .ay be carried out on
subsequently higher order parameters until one is found to be not
Significantly different fro. zero. In this case the autoregressive
process would be taken as one order below the order of the parameter
for Which the null hypothesis was accepted, m practice it is rare
to find an autoregressive process higher than two (Glass et al.,
1975), thus it is unlikely that the inflation of alpha fro. multiple
tests would be a serious problem. In order to make this identification
technique as efficient as possible the researcher would first plot
the autocorrelation function in an attempt to identify the appropriate
model. This would be followed by the hypothesis testing procedure to
confirm or reject the identified model.
The second stage in the ARIMA model identification process
requires determining d. the identification of the order of the poly-
nomial. This may be accomplished by testing the regression coeffi-
cients associated with higher order trends. Specifically, if the
second degree coefficients were shown to equal zero then the initial
assumption that the series lies on a straight line is supported. How-
ever, if this hypothesis were rejected, indicating a second order trend,
then it would be necessary to test the third degree coefficients.
Although the form of these tests will be different, the logic is
identical to that found in Chapter III.
This may be illustrated by comparing equations [A.l] and
[4.34]. If one sets k equal to two then the regression coefficients
in [4.34] correspond to a second degree polynomial. Formulating a
hypothesis that these coefficients are equal to zero is tantamount
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to testing ehe presence of a second degree polynomial. I, this
hypothesis is accepted and a similar hypothesis on the coefficients
in [4.1] is rejected, the researcher
.ay conclude that the series is
best represented by a first order polynomial.
Given the discussion In the section "Tests of Hypotheses,"
tests for these higher order polynomial trends would be straightfor-
ward to work out. For example suppose one wanted to test the coef-
ficients in [4.34al when k = 2. The general hypotheses may be stated
as,
[5.1]
where,
[5.2]
and C is chosen as,
[5.3] c =
3 = [Z^^ I Y]01 02
loo'
0 10
A second test may be done for the post-treatment series. In fact, if
the investigator was not interested in the exact form of the poly-
nomial, the logic outlined in Chapter III could be applied here in
order to make a preliminary inference on the presence of a treatment
effect. That is, the degree, k, for the pre- or post-treatment series
(whichever has more observations) could be compared with the degree of
the polynomial for the entire series. If these were the same then no
treatment effect would be inferred, otherwise (k ?^ k ,) there
^ p total^ i-iici-t;
would be evidence that the treatment had an effect.
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Once the model is identified the ARIMA framework gives a
maximum likelihood procedure for estimating the parameters. For
example, suppose a first order autoregressive model has been identi-
fied with parameter 0, such that |ej<l to ensure stationarity
. A
maximum likelihood estimation procedure would look at the error
variance generated at each value of 0, as it was incremented in
steps of
.02 from
-1 to .1 (see Glass et al., p. 127). The point at
which the error variance is smallest would yield the estimate of 0,.
To complete the ARIMA analysis a second set of estimates
must be gotten for the parameters associated with level (L) and
intervention (6) effects. We may write the first order autoregressive
model for the pre-treatment series as
^^•^^^
^ - L = O(z^.^-L) + e^ ,
and the post-treatment series as,
^^•^^^
^t + 6) = ei[z^_^-(L + 6)] + e,.
These models may be put into the general linear form by applying the
transformation,
t5-6] y^ = (1 _ 0^)L + .
The transformed models expressed jointly in matirx form are,
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[5.7a]
or.
yi 1 0
1 -
•
01 0
•
y„p 1 - ©1
•
0
1 — 01 1
•
1 -
•
01 1 -
•
1 - 01 1 -
-p+1
'p+q
[5.7b] Z = X6 + e
For a fixed value of 0, the least squares estimates of L and 6 are
given by.
[5.8]
= (X^X) ^
It is at this point that a serious limitation arises with the ARIMA
models. In order to estimate L and 6 the elements of the X matrix
must be treated as constants. However, as discussed earlier, the para-
meter ©1 is actually an estimate resulting from a maximum likelihood
estimation procedure. Consequently 0i is subject to sampling error
which in turn introduces an unknown amount of bias into the second set
of estimates [L, 6].
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n>e effect of this bias on the estimate, b' =[£«), have
several consequences. Specifically, the ordinary least squares esti-
mate for b may not be optimal when the errors are not homoscedastlc.
Secondly, the distribution of b will not be multivariate normal.
Third, the classical estimate of the error variance, = (j,- [i -
X(X'X)-lx')z)/(N-2) for the model given by Equation [5.7, may not have
the required chl-square distribution, since the matrix X Is not fixed.
Fourth, the quantity
{N-2}* (b. - 3^)/s
will not have the well known t-dlstribution. Ihus, hypotheses con-
cerning L and 6 cannot be tested using conventional test procedures.
The degree to which the sample dependent behavior of the estimate of Q,
and the other higher order parameters affect the estimates of L and 6
,
and their sampling distribution has yet to be determined.
The procedures outlined here avoid introducing an estimation
bias into the estimates of L and 6 by providing a method for simultan-
eously estimating the autoregressive parameters (e.g., Q^) and the
regression coefficients. The conditionalized model contains the auto-
regressive parameters in addition to the regression coefficients
associated with the pre- and post-treatment curves. In this model
all the parameters are estimated simultaneously thereby avoiding the
bias created by the two-stage ARIMA procedures. Furthermore, as
illustrated, the simultaneous estimation of parameters makes the
procedure easily implementable through available regression anlaysis
computer programs such as SPSS.
One consequence of using the conditlonall.ed
„odel Is that
a certain number of observations in the series are treated as con-
stants. The number depends upon the extent of the conditioning. Por
example, a first order autoregressive process requires that the ob-
served series be conditioned on the i^ediatel, preceding and post-
ceding Observation. This reduces the nu.ber of observations upon
Which the estimates are based by a factor of .5. Por a second order
autoregressive process the original series will be reduced by a factor
of
.66. This problem is discussed next.
Mathematically, in order to be able to obtain estimates of
1. the matrix X'X in the conditionalized model must be of full rank.
This condition of full rank is met only if the number of observations
in the reduced series exceeds the number of parameters, and no column
of the X matrix can be exactly expressed as weighted linear combina-
tions of other columns (Finn, 1974, p. 97). The conditionalized model
has two subsets of parameters. One subset are the parameters associated
with the autoregressive scheme. Equation [A. 11] gives the combined
model ( ^ = X ^ , e*. ^ . .
Nxl Nx5 5x1 Nxl ^ linear series with a first order
autoregressive error process. This particular model has five param-
eters. Thus, to estimate S (or a) there must be a minimum of six
observations in the reduced series. In actual practice, however, the
number of observations has to be much larger than that required for
the estimability of ^.
In one sense, the problem of losing observations to the
conditionalizing requirement is offset by the fact that the informa-
tion contained in the "conditionalizing" observations is used in an
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ancillary
,Hat is.
,y Seating
..ese observations as con-
sents it is possible to estimate the parameters associated with
polynomial trends and serial correlations. XH.s. while the analysis
is performed on the reduced series the information contained in the
conditionali.ins observations is in fact used, thoush in a different
way.
The major drawback of the procedure is that treatment
effects are "washed om-" k„ «.uut by the y parameter when the autocorrela-
tion parameter is positive In t^ki^ / i •F . Table 4.1, it can be seen that the
simulated treatment effprf ^'^ ^ect (i.e., augmenting the post-treatment
series by two) is detected when p = -.6 but not when p =
.6. This
asymmetry may be explained by referring to equation [4.41], and
the relationship between p and y.
In the example it was pointed out that the treatment ef-
fect may be associated with a^^ and a^^. Thus, from [4.41] we get
t5.9a] a, = z - ^ An-1 ^2n+1
, ^ ^01 2n ' ^ 0 ) + e*
,
^ 2n
and
r5.9b] a = Z - y .^n-1 ^n+l
02 2n ^ 2 ^ ^2n
By taking the expectations of [5.9, a and b] we get.
and
= p - Y (
2n-l ^2n+l
01 ^2n ' 9 )
a = u
/2n-l + t^2n+l
%z ^zn- y ( 0 ) .
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However, because the series is horUontal the expectations of .
!z , _ 2n'
2n-V ^2n+l the same; thus,
[5.10a]
ot - n N
and
02 ^2n ^
When p is positive, y will also be positive and greater
than p. This follows fro. y = 2p/(l+p2). ^hus, when p =
.6, y =
.88.
To the extent that y is large, the quantity 1-y is small which
greatly reduces the difference between a,^ and a,,. Unfortunately,
the standard error of a^^la^^ does not decrease rapidly enough to
offset this. On the other hand, when p is negative the treatment
effect associated with a^, and a,^ is not reduced. That is, the
parameter (1-y) is greater than one.
Finally, two more points need to be mentioned. First, the
procedures require multiple tests which effect alpha in an unknown
way. Thus, the researcher must exercise caution when testing various
aspects of the time series. Second, while it is mathematically
possible to obtain estimates of g with one more observation than
parameters, the number of observations required in order to get
reasonably stable estimates must wait for actual data.
Conclusions
Several points be .ade about the procedures outlined
m the previous chapters. Fi.st. procedure one is useful when the
ti.e points are
.eans and the researcher is not interested in the
exact nature of the curve. Furthennore, the test outlined in
Chapter III is easy to carry out and conceptually straightforward.
Procedure two is useful when the time points are single
observations rather than
.eans. Following the guidelines given by
Box and Jenkins (1976) it is reco:n.ended that 50 to 100 observations
are collected. When the original series is conditionalized, the
number of observations is reduced to pH-q-h/h-fl, when p and q are
the number of the pre- and post-treatment observations and h is the
order of the autoregressive scheme associated with the error process.
The major limitation of procedure two is that it is unable
to detect treatment effects in the presence of a positive auto-
regressive parameter. However, if the researcher is working with a
process in which the autoregressive parameter is negative then
procedure two would be appropriate.
The major advantage of the procedure outlined here is that
it is appropriate for examining the error scheme. For example, Yj
,
of the pre-treatment series may be compared to of post-treatment
series. Higher order y's may be tested to determine the order of
the autoregressive scheme. These two tests of y may be viewed as a
more rigorous examination of the autoregressive scheme than the
Durbin-Watson approach or inspection of the autocorrelation function.
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Tests Of
,
3houla
.e done i„ eonJuneUon „Uh a plot of tHe auto-
correlation function rather than instead of plotting rhe
.orrelosra„
Table
..1 confirms these conclusions. That Is, the estimate
P of p, given by
a = (1 -
accurately reproduces the original parameter. However, further „orU
-
clearly necessary 1„ this area to compare the sampling properties
of the various estimates of p that are currently available.
CHAPTER VI
Fro. Tl^ series Analysis to Philosophical Reflections
In the next chapter, the predo^nant
.odel of e=cplanatlon in
the social sciences (He.pel and Oppenhel^. 1948; Kerllnger. 1964) Is
considered fro. a philosophical perspective. Specifically, a rela-
tional perspective (e.g.. Colllngwood. 1956; HarrI and Secord. 1972)
is adopted which focuses on the notions of "event" and "action" m
social science research. Dray (1957) draws an Interesting distinct-
ion between the statements,
1. A's reason for doing x was y
2. The cause of A's doing x was y.
He argues that the difference between these statements Is point of
view. In statement one, the point of view is that of an agent, where
agency involves such concepts as Intention, motive and reason. On
the other hand the point of view in statement two is that of manipula-
tor, where manipulation involves such concepts as control, detachment
and causality. Here the relational perspective embodies the agency
point of view. Furthermore, the example from Dray (1957) begins to
make the distinction between two different approaches to explaining
phenomena; a distinction which will be drawn more clearly in the next
chapter. The purpose of this chapter is to highlight themes found in
the next chapter by examing the explanatory efficacy of time series
designs presented in the previous chapters.
The central feature of time series designs is, obviously
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enoush. ti^. p„,,_,,
^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^
the „ost central feature of e^irlcal explanation, at least
.Ince the
writings Of Hn^ (Kl„. i,„). Multiple tl^ series designs which e^loy
two concurrent series attest to estahllsh the te^oral contiguity between
the events In each series and thereby Infer cause and effect. One of
the earliest exaioples of this type of analysis Is found In Yule (1926)
when he studied the relationship between thunderstorm activities and the
occurrence of sun spots.
A cursory glance at the recent methodology literature in social
science Indicates that multiple time series designs have excellent explan-
atory power. Campbell and Stanley (1963). Campbell (1963), Campbell
(1969). Riecken. Boruch et al. (1974) and Cook and Campbell (1975) give
this design high ratings for dealing effectively with various threats to
experimental validity. Ihe major threat to a clear interpretation of
time series data comes from the effects of reactivity due to repeated
measures taken on individuals or groups. This difficulty is overcome
somewhat when the measures are archival or unobtrusive.
If reactivity is controlled for then the explanatory
efficacy of time series designs resides in the close temporal linkage of
experimental events. However, from the standpoint of agency temporal
contiguity may be a notion that is more ethical than scientific. For
example, the participants perception of the treatment may foster inten-
tions on their part to improve, rather than the treatment causing them
to improve. Had the relationships been different between the partici-
pants and researchers, different intentions (e.g., subversive rather
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than cons„.eave, eouia Have Been
.o.e.e.
.,e...
.ve.s.n.
.^.c.
Of the
..eat^n,.
ly m business.
slgniacance of a particular
seouence of events (or better stated - actions) Is »ore of an ethical
consequence than a scientific result. i„ the sequel the Intention of
^ohn Henry to defeat the stea. pile drlv. Is contrasted to the threat of
^aansator^ rlva^ to causal Interpretation (Cook and Ca^bell. 1975.
p. 232; Saretsky, 1972).
The substitution of the word action for event brings up
another set of points which
.ay be highlighted here. Since Bridgn^n
(1945) coined the phrase "operational definition" research social
scientists have been consistently changing actions into events. Simi-
larly. Ki. (19 73) points out that the notion of "event classes", like
ten^oral contiguity, is also central to scientific explanation. Event
classes involve judgtnents of similarity which distribute events into
classes. Such judgments about events are central in empirical work
such as time series where the tracking of a process, classroom or
individual requires repeated judgments that an occurrence at one time
Is the same as subsequent occurrences. Moreover, the appropriate use
of probability theory depends upon the success of event class logic.
That is, the activity of counting "events" permit the application of the
probability axioms. In turn the deductions from these axioms result in
compelling scientific explanations.
In the next chapter it is argued that social science event-
bound methodology is limited. Part of this limitation stems from
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overloCins agency which is necessary to con^
. hody of knowledge
(Magoon. 19„).
.„.he™.e. U Is potenUally unethical eo generate
predictions fro. expert defined event classes when the resulting know-
ledge is either Inaccessible or unlntelllgihle to those that the know-
ledge is about. in contrast to this the relational perspective
developed In the ne« chapter views knowledge of hu.an events/actions
as mutually Intelligible. For knowledge to be
.utually Intelligible
It needs to embody connnon values as well as an agreed upon corpus of
facts. Moreover, as will be pointed out, the line between fact and
value is not clear cut.
Finally, to explicitly infuse our work with values need not
exclude doing empirical research. However, the empiricism is inter-
active; we continually confront results with dialogue which, by its
very nature, is rich in questions of fact and value. It is no
longer the facts that compel us to accept an explanation but the dia-
logue. This theme is not new. It is simply a variation on the theme
that it is the meanings we hold for things which generates our under-
standing not the facts (Hudson, 1972; Connolly, 1974; Magoon, 1977).
In the chapter that follows the metaphor is changed. Popper
(1959) likened scientific activity to that of a crew of sailors busily
repairing individual planks to ensure the seaworthiness of the ship.
This image of the scientist/sailor shows them to be unconcerned about
where the ship is going.
The new metaphor is Ouroboros, an ancient Greek snake that is
eating its tail. The snake bends around upon itself in a self
reflective posture and a circle or wheel which implies
.ove^nt.
The head Joined to the tail represents a unity between two parts,
l^us Ouroboros as a ^taphor symbolizes the discipline as self-
reflecting, progressing and achieving unity such as would be sought
between the researched and researcher through dialogue. Both are
parts of the same "body".
The ancient snake is a richer and more dramatic image of
science than the wooden ship. it captures the humor and tragedy of
our pursuit. m our far reading inquiries what we discover is our-
selves (Baker, 1977). Through the process of inquiry we grow to
recognize and obliquely fear the possibility of our own death (Berger
and Luckmann, 1967); the snake devours itself.
The sequel contains philosophical reflections on experimen-
tal explanation. Chapter VII begins with an exposition of the
"covering law" model of explanation and then moves to an analysis of
event as an element of scientific explanation. "Event" and its philo-
sophical analogue "action" are contrasted and the implications for
explanation are considered. Some of these implications are critical
of current practices, particularly the traditional experimental practice
of separating science from philosophy. Though this thesis is divided
into parts I and II, the parts are juxtaposed, and like the head and
tail of Ouroboros, they are joined by a common body.
PART II
PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS
"The fact is the sweetest dream that labor knows'
Robert Frost
CHAPTER VII
Erklaren and Event
Introduction: Two PersnerMv^c
von Wright (1971) credits the German historian-philosopher
Droysen with articulatins the distinction hetween ^JOa^ (explanation)
and verstahen (understanding)
. n.e suhject of this chapter is the
covering law
.odel of explanation (erJO^) and event, an essential
part of this type of explanation. tte subject of the next chapter is
interactive «,dels of understanding (e.g.. Dray, 1957; Harre and
Secord, 1972), and the philosophical and historical analogue of event,
action.
To begin, a distinction is made between event and action.
Collingwood (1946) says,
... By the outside of the event I mean
everything belonging to it which can be
described in terms of bodies and their
movements: the passage of Caesar, accom-
panied by certain men, across a river
called the Rubicon at one date, or the
spilling of his blood on the floor of the
senate-house at another. By the inside
of the event I mean that in it which can
only be described in terms of thought:
Caesar's defiance of Republican law, or
the clash of constitutional policy between
himself and his assassins." (p. 213)
There are two points in the Collingwood quote which need emphasis.
First, he divides observations of a singular phenomenon into "outside"
and "inside" aspects. Second, an adequate understanding of the phenom-
enon includes an analysis of the "inside" aspect; description of bodies
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and their ™nts is not sufficient.
.or the purposes of this thesis
the outside Of an event will be referred to as si.pl, "evenf. whereas
the inside of an event will be referred to as action. Events are exter
nal to us as observers, we stand over against the., they are discrete
and enu.erative. On the other hand, the core of an action involves
such concepts as .otive, intention and purpose, and actions require so.e
form of interaction, whether the interaction be through empathy or
actual participation. To some extent this distinction between event
and action parallels the distinction between erkl^ren and verstehen
.
By dividing a singular phenomenon into event and action one
risks reinstating a Cartesian dualism with the accompanying "ghost in
the machine" (Ryle, 1949). This dualism divides the self into body
(observable movements) and mind (the ghost). The intentions and plans
of the mind are inaccessible and one studies actions by watching
behavioral events (Care and Landesman, 1968). However, 19th and 20th
century philosophy of science (see Russell, 1945 for a survey) rejected
Descartes' mind-body dualism for a monistic position which dropped the
notion of mind. In fact two monisms developed, one associated with
positive science (Camap, 1936; Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948; Braith-
waite, 1953; Popper, 1959, 1963; Reichenbach, 1968), and the other
associated with recent social philosophy critical of positive science
(Mannheim, 1936; Dray, 1957; Winch, 1958; Maclntyre, 1973; Connolly,
1974). This second position may be characterized by a quote from
Dray (1974),
"To discover and understand their life, we
need to be able to do more than regularize,
predict, and retrodict their actions; we
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view of them LTt^ 1/' "^^"^ '° "^^^ ^
it, fro^\SJ^°"^^|:°°J,»i8ht have
standing and evaluation of human life the
^^^^^^H^i^lt-^Lagenc^". (original emphall^g)
Discussion Of this second perspective is contained in the next chapter.
T^e remainder of this chapter deals with a concept of explana-
tion (i.e., erlOaren) as it is illustrated by the covering law model
(Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948)
. discussion gives attention to the
explanatory role of event, particularly to the way probability theory
defines and uses the notion of event to "lubricate- the inferential
machinery of applied statistics. Before introducing the covering law
model, a brief history leading up to this model and the scientific con-
cept of event is given. Finally diagram 7.1 is provided to help
organize some of the ideas presented thus far.
Antecedents of Event and Coverin g Law Model
In earlier times the events which made up explanations were
linked to religious frameworks and cosmological systems. Causes of
disease, deviance and so forth were attributed to gods, objects in
nature (animism) or magical powers in certain individuals. For example,
the African Azande culture practiced witchcraft and counter witchcraft
to influence such events as love, hate or rain (Wilson, 1970). In
many ways medieval metaphysics may be viewed as the culmination of
methods which linked events to supernatural forces. For the scholastics
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Two Types of Explanation^
Scientific/Causal (erklaren) Historical/Teleological (verstehen)
Main feature: Covering laws
or generalizations.
Activities
:
1. Isolate causes and
effects
2. Generalize covering
laws
3. Explain effects
(retrospective)
4. Predict effects
(prospective)
Main feature: Agency and relational
perspective.
Activities:
1. Reenactment (empathy)
2. Dialogue (construct mean-
ings)
3. Render action intelligible
(retrospective)
4. Anticipate action (prospective)
Other features:
1
. General
2. Value free observation
Other features:
1. Contextual
2. Value laden observation
Dichotomy is illustrative. In actual fact a true dichotomy does not
exist For example. Popper (1963), a scientist, argues that observa-tion is value laden, not value free.
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a priori notions of divine forces „e.e essential to explanations of
events
The detachment of events Qnr^h, suc as cause or effect, from super-
natural forces and the placement nfP o them on observationally neutral
grounds was a slow process. While ^the^tics was flourishing since
the Greek period, it had not .et been applied to the concrete events
Of daily life (Langer, 1942)
.
m the arena of Bacon (1561-1626) was
one of the earliest thinkers to reject the a priori ^taphystcs of the
scholastics and seek knowledge that resulted fro„ the systematic
collection of observations. His inductive method sought to detach
observations fro. any metaphysical beliefs. Bacon filled note books
"1th specific observations from which he attempted to induce general
Statements about these events.
Another scientist/philosopher who rejected the scholastic
methods was Hobbes (1588-1679). Unlike Bacon, Hobbes was a deductivist.
Enamored at an early age with the power of geometric proof, he believed
that human nature could be viewed in a mechanical way and thereby deduce
the specifier. Hobbes wrote extensively about psychology as an
objective study of humans as machines, a study which he envisioned to be
unfettered by scholastic metaphysics.
Only Hobbes and Bacon are mentioned in the transition to more
objective notions of events among a myriad of others (Copernicus,
Descartes, Newton, Locke,...) because they capture two essential parts
of scientific explanation: deduction and induction. Although this
methodological aspect of the scientific disciplines is still debated
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aaUatos an.
, ^^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^
and deduction l^ortant for the growth of knowledge (Popper. 1,59;
Cattell, 1966; Medawar, 1969).
The break fro. scholastic notions was
.uch slower for the
social sciences than the physical sciences, and wasn't achieved until
the turn Of this century. Major physical science advances In theory
and technology during the 19th century created a wave of optics, for
the fledgeling new sciences such as sociology and psychology. Eager
for similar successes, social scientists adopted the methods of physi-
cal science (Boring, 1950). ^e explanation of human actions/events
.oved from a divine deter^nlsm to a scientific determinism. A major
requirement of scientific explanation Is that every event be capable
of consistent labeling by independent observers. This positive and
consistent Identification of an event via observation became known as
positivism. For an excellent, though terminology laden, review of
the various posltlvlstlc and antiposltivistic positions in philosophy
and science see Giedymin (1975).
Auguste Comte (1798-1857) is considered the founder of posi-
tivism in social science (Giddens. 1974). He based valid knowledge on
the immediately observable and rejected introspection. However, it
was Ernst Mach (1838-1916) who laid down the fundamental tenets of
positivism for psychology and furnished the epistemological link between
psychology and physics (Boring, 1950). Machian positivism goes back
to Hume in its emphasis on contiguity in space and particularly in
time. Like Comte, Mach's positivism was experiential.
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Early in the 20th century the Vienna Circle (Schlick, Camap
Hussell, Peisl)
...empted to establish demarcation criteria which would
place statements and events inside or outside of the science arena
Any statement or event which may be directly or indirectly observed (as
part of a theoretical net) was considered potentially verifiable. If
something could be verified, it was scientific. Later Popper (1959,
1963) took issue with the veriflability criterion and advanced a
falsifiability criterion. That is, a hypothesis was scientific if it
was potentially falsifiable. The members of the Vienna Circle became
known as logical positivlsts because the application of the verifica-
tion principle was based on logical considerations.
Gradually the experiential positivism of Comte and Mach, and
the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle merged to form two wide-
spread methodological perspectives in social science: operationalism
and behaviorism (Bridgman, 19A5; Watson, 1930; Sidman, 1960; Skinner,
1974). Operationalization is a measurement process in which members
are assigned to events or objects according to some rule (Stevens,
1946). For example, the definition of acid in an operational framework
becomes the testing operation of inserting blue litmus paper into the
solution. The assignment rule gives the event or object meaning.
That is, the liquid is acid if and only if the litmus paper turns red
(Hempel, 1966). in the social sciences operationalism means that
concepts such as aggression are defined by operations: "hitting, slap-
ping, pushing the child without provocation from that child, and with
enough force to make that child cry".. Within the operational framework
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events become items on a list of «kobservable category descriptions which
may be checked and later counted (Hutt and Hutt, 1970).
In the remainder of this chapter operationalized events are
examined within the framework of the covering law model of explanation
(Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948). Specifically, the probabilistic form of
explanation, rather than the universal form, is discussed (Hempel, 1966).
certain requirements must be met before the concept of event may be
successfully employed in probabilistic explanations. In the subsequent
chapter an alternate view of event is presented which leads into the
second form of explanation outlined in Figure 7.1.
Covering Law Model of Explanation
The anatomy of explanation is complex (Collingwood, 1946;
Gardiner, 1952; Toulmin. 1953; Braithwaite, 1953; Dray, 1957; Popper,
1959, 1963; Scheffler, 1963, von Wright, 1971) and as Scheffler laments,
ambiguous. Modem difficulties stem from Hume's denial of necessary
connections between matters of fact. Here our concern is with causal
explanations examined in terms of the covering law model of explanation
advanced by Hempel and Oppenheim (1948). 'n.e roots of this model may
be traced back through Comte and Mill to Hume (Dray, 1957; von Wright,
1971).
Popper (1959) succinctly describes the covering law model,
"To give a causal explanation of an event
means to deduce a statement which describes
it, using as premises of the deduction one
or more universal laws, together with singu-
lar statements, the initial conditions",
(p. 59, original emphasis)
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and ™ive.sal law.: „ater expands when u tree.es.
H:^la„atlc„
„ay e«e„d beyond particular event, such as a
-rst radiator to Include explanation o. particular laws. ,
accomplished h. suhsu^n, or
..covering, these laws with more co.prehen-
-ve laws. Kor example, the valldlt. ol Oallleo's law
.or the tree
fall Of hodles on earth
.ay he subsumed under Kewton's law of gravl-
-"on. i^ere are four logical requirements for a covering law
explanation (Hempel and Oppenheim. 1948, pp.10-11):
!• The explanandum must be a
of the explanans. * consequence
^'
Tot IZ^TT T' S^"*"! laws requiredf r the derivation of the explanandum.
3. Ihe explanans must have empirical content.
^^^=""^"<=as constituting the explanans must be
This model Is diagrammed In Figure 7.2.
model Is also referred to as
"deductlve-nomologlcaV because of the
logical relationship between the explanans and explanandum.
Current formulations of explanation contain the essential ele-
n^nts Of the covering law model as It Is outlined here, though certain
aapects (e.g., inductive or deductive) may be emphasized. w,at is
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logical
deduction
L Ll U
Event
Figure 7.2
Statements of
antecedent
conditions
General laws
Description of
empirical
phenomenon to
be explained
Covering Law Model
(from Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948, p.H)
Explanans
Explanandum
co^on a»ong these
.odels are the generalizations which acco^any events
A (cause) and B (effect). For exa^le. Popper (1952) stresses the
Importance of a universal hypothesis and Gardiner (1952) discusses the
notion of "regularity analysis" In which the observed regularities are
gathered Into a law. Moreover, the model Is consistent with Hume's
critique of necessity.
Hume's critique of necessity shifted the debate about what
constitutes correct causal explanation from making correct deductions to
justifying inductive inferences. That is. if the existing generaliza-
tion, which predicts a specific event in the explanandum, is in turn
supported by the occurrence of these events, then the explanation is
justified. Both deductive and inductive reasoning are present. How-
ever, in contrast to Descartes, we no longer have deductive certainty.
That is, from Hume onwards the generalizations made from the regular
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connecuon even. U
.Ke eon.Wn. co-o™„ces
-ese even.. Ko.H.n, actuaU.^ 3„a .,e
.ene.aU.aUo.s
...
be
.o..ae. „.e„ ana^olcus
.eXat.on to .He gene.aU.at.on) even,
are o.se.ve<.. I„ei.e„taXl„
.M. a.,u.e„t eonta.n.
..e rationale
observational work tT^^n „as well as replication of empirical conclusions.
In social science the e^hasis is clearly on induction
(Cs^bell and Stanley. 1,63; Kerlinger, 1,64; Cattell. 1,66). never-
theless the
.odel for explanation is essentially the sa^. m fact
although Popper's work has been labeled as
"hypothetico-deductive".
he clai^ to be an inductivist (Popper. 1,70). i^u. deductive-
Inductive split ^y be «„t once Hu^'s point about the i^osslbillty
of showing necessary connections between matters of fact is accepted.
The fact that most work In social science Is statistical in
nature does not effect the appropriateness of the covering law »,del
as a model of social scientific explanation. According to Hempel
(1966) there are two forms to the covering law model of explanation:
Deductive-nomological and probabilistic. ae deductive-nomologlcal
Is based on laws of universal form whereas the latter is based on laws
of probabilistic form. I„ probabilistic explanation the explanans
imply the explanandum with high probability. For example a probabil-
istic explanation may be schematized as follows:
The probability for persons exposed to
the measles to catch the disease is high.
Jim was exposed to the measles.
[makes highly probable]
Jim caught the measles (Hempel, 1966. p. 2,)
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logic nor the role of evidence differs fron, ^H ^ .a tt a om that found in the deductive
P--"U.. . .e. „oe
^ ^^^^^^^^
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^.„aeUa„ geneUcs
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.aU
la axed wHe^eaa
.Ke p.o.aMlU. o. a .a„,e
.ataZU. „UX va. ,.o.
.0 .ea. xo
.ev.e„
.Heae
.saues He«
^„
the pu.p„aea
„, .His aUcuaa.on. p.aHe. Has an e..eUe„. pape.
on different levels of probability statements, and Coulaon (1976)
reviews tHe Historical develop„.„t of probability notlona.
The efficacy of a covering law explaxiatlon comes from tHe
logical relatlonsHlp between tHe explanana and explanandu..
^at'la
the logical relationship permits predictions to be made. However. tHe
Juatlflcatlon for tHls explanatory force emerges from tHe observation of
events In the explanans (I.e.. antecedent conditions) and the explanan-
dun. The Inductive nature of the Justification predudea proof
(Scheffler. 1963). Moreover, within the framework contingent on ob-
served events, the relationship between the explanans and explanandum
Is logical. That Is. If these antecedents occur and these generaliza-
tions apply, then this event will obtain or la predicted (universally
or with a given probability)
.
In the next section, what-is-observed. or event, is examined.
Of particular interest is the independent relationships among and
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between even.-as-cause ana even.-ae-eHect
.e,.,.ea ^o. .He
.^.Unation
to succeed.
Event
In this section „e examine the "status" of an event vls-a-
vls other events, particularly event-as-cause and event-as-effect. ae
domain of this discussion Is prohabUlstlc explanation which Is a type
Of covering law explanation (Hempel, 1966).
"Event" is a central concept in probability theory and hence
a central concept to probabilistic explanation. m virtually every
graduate level textbook on statistical inference in social science
there is a discussion of the notion of event. For example. Hayes
(1963) says,
" ••• events are sets, or classes, havlnp
the elementary events as members . The
elementary events are the raw materials
that make up event classes. The occur-
rence of any member of event class A makes
us say that event A has occurred. Since
an^ subset of the sample space is an event,
then some event must occur on each and
every trial of the experiment", (p. 49,
original emphasis)
Savage (1954) defines event as a set of states where a state is a des-
crlption o f the world, leaving no relevant aspect undescribed (p. 9).
Bailey (1971) defines a set as an aggregation of "objects" where the
objects are mutually exclusive and referred to as events. In the con-
text of probability theory we take event to be like an object; it is
enumeratlve and thus is distinguishable from other events. Moreover,
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it is these obJec-liUe properties of events which give the p.ohahilit.
axlo^ and operations such a powerful deductive range.
A
.ajor requirement of the covering law model is that event-
as-cause and event-as-effeet are logically independent (von Wright.
1"1)
.
^is is the central part of Hume's critique of necessity.
If causes were not distinguishahle from effects then the ohservation of
an event-as-effect could not bear on the truth value of the law or
generalisation which connects cause and effect. That is. the truth
value Of the laws is not a matter of logical necessity, but contingent
on the testimony of experience (see von Wright, 1971. p.l8). Por
example, to say that X's behavior was caused by his intentions violates
this independence require^nt. This is because intention cannot be
defined without making reference to its object, the behavior. In con-
trast to intention, the concept "spark" is defined independently of
explosion, although a spark may cause an explosion. Also an explosion
may result from something other than a spark. Ihe spark has intrinsic
properties to distinguish it from explosion whereas intention does not.
Incidentally Cook and Campbell (1975) rule out Intentional concepts
(e.g., compensatory rivalry) as threats to causal inference. This
point is discussed in Chapter VIII.
While events-as-cause and events-as-effects are logically
independent, the explanandum, as noted earlier, is logically deduced
from the explanans. This apparent contradiction may be resolved by
considering the difference between the Independent properties of cause
(and/or effect) on the one hand, and the temporal contiguity of a
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variety of antecedent conditions with the explanand™. on the other
ion. Furthermore the Ueg
.ust be dry. Once these requirement, are
»et (and possibly so.e others), then one would predict an explosion.
Hence the effect (explosion) Is a logical deduction of the e:^lanans.
and the spark, as a cause of the explosion. Is logically Independent
of the explosion.
Event as it is defined in probability theory is compatible
with the logical independence requirement of the covering law .odel.
Textbook discussions of probability theory begin with notions of
event, set and independence
. For exainple, Kerlinger (1973) says.
One of the chief purposes of research
design is to set up conditions of inde-
pendence of events so that conditions
of dependence of events can be adequately
studied, (p. 106)
The well known probability rule states that if events A and B are
independent, the probability of their joint occurrence is simply the
product of their separate probabilities. If this rule holds then
events A and B are said to be statistically independent
. A few
examples discussing the notion of independence will help illustrate how
it is extended to statistical explanations.
Within the framework of the general linear model a given
column of the design matrix may not be dependent on some linear combina-
tion of the other columns. A violation of this requirement prevents
one from obtaining unique estimates of regression coefficients or the
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effects Of
..n.epen.en.. va..aMes an anal.s.s of va.We context
-is woul.
.e an exa^Xe of the general
.e.ui.e.„. statistical dis-
tribution theo:. that relevant para^ters are independent so that point
estimates and significance regions
.e obtained. It should be
noted that the independence attained here is a.ong the„ or
independent variables rather than between the causes and effects.
This is necessary in order to be able to attribute the effects to
specific independent variables.
To illustrate the independence between cause and effect we
examine the psychometric model of intellieencp mo u-LULeixxg e. it may be represent-
ed by the covering law model as follows,
Cl C2
• • • Antecedent
conditions,
including
test items
Explanans
Li L2
.
.
. General laws
including
the construct
of intelligence
- [makes highly
probable]
^"^ent Response pattern
on intelligence
test
Explanandum
Figure 7.3
Covering Law Model of the Construct of Intelligence
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The co„3„uce o.
.„.eU.sence
...
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of test Ite. responses
.snifest 1„ the explanan.u.. This is not a
trivial point; so^ „.ite.s have state, that intelUsenoe is what the
intelXi^ence test
.easutes (Coo.enough. - 194,) . „o„,.„.
this is tegatded as an unacceptable tantolosy. appealing to factor analy-
tic results and other construct validation techniques.
It is also worth noting that many lte.n analysis techniques
depend on the notion of independence.
.or example, the probability of
a correct response depends conceptually upon the difficulty of the item
and the ability of the testee. response to an lte» must be inde-
pendent of the items which precede it. if this latter condition does
not hold (and it may not), then the psychometriclan's ability to ferret
out the worth of an item from proportion correct Information (item
difficulty) and biserial correlations with total test score (ability) Is
impaired.
Smnmary
The major point throughout this discussion has been that the
notion of independence (logical and/or statistical) is a major feature
of the relationships among and between events-as-cause and events-as-
effects. Without this independence between events, the path to clear
explanation is muddied. In order to conform to the requirements of
proper explanation, probabilistic definitions of event present it as
objective and separable from other events. These generic definitions
of events permit them to be independently enumerated as well as
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lubricate the inferential ^chinery of statistics. Futthe^te. it was
ar.uad that the notion of independence in probability was co^atible
with the covering law model of explanation.
In Chapter VIII a second kind of explanation (see Figure 7.1)
which contrasts with the covering law
.odel. Is discussed within this
second model (agent-relational) the traditional independence of cause
and effect is questioned. Through the notion of agency the cause and
effect are related through use and rules rather than by generalizations
connecting distinct referents.
CHAPTER Vlli
Verstehen and Action
Many advocates of scientific explanation argue that tHonly one kind of explanation that Is ade .
1948- Bral^. •
»d Oppenhel„,
948, th„a.te. 1953; Scheffler, 1,63; Nagel 1,70> .is, ipso facto, scientific. .
Explanation
"o„s
„o„
^-^-tions a.e^ explana-
tlons may be given for- ^-u
*^^-Lana-
ent
.i„ds f diffe.
one may obse-rv** a . example,"^y O se ve A crossing the street v^r^r.^ . F om one point of view this
occurrence may be explained by referring to ^h
. . ^
^ '° ^^Hses of A's behavior.
" one
.y hold that the^ a crossed the street is
y in the seouel an
"agent-relational" point of yie„ is developed
"
—
-
alternative perspective has
.een charact-
a9.8) refer to nonscientific explanation as teleological.
.i.
Of explanation is acco^lished
.y referring to so.e event in the future
such 3S purpose (psychology) or function (hiology)
. J
"on Of teleological explanation is the danger of
-tion. ^at is. the purpose of an event/action is discovered after
the action has taken place; thus this Uind of explanation lac.s predict-
ive force. Both He^el and Oppenhel. (1948) and Nagel (1970) reduce
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the difference between teleological-teoiogi and causal explanation to syntax
arguing that a teleological statement,
'
v!w\f temperature undervariable pressure alter their volumes
ure and volume constant,"
may be restated in causal terms,
"The volume of a gas at constant tempera-ture varies inversely with its pressure."
Nagel (1970, p.l08) says that the difference is one of selective attent-
Ion rather than of asserted content.
He»pel and Oppenhelm (1948) attribute the popularity of teleo-
logical explanation to its tendency to ^ke us feel like we "understand-
when a purpose Is articulated. Verstehen or understanding may be
traced back to the writings of Droysan and Wllhelm DUthey (von Wright.
1971). According to Magoon (1977) verstehen concerns the assuinption
that,
... an act's meaning to the actor can
be explained in at least one way:
place the observer in the actor's
situation and see what meaning he then
gives to the action." (p. 660)
As mentioned earlier Droysan was the first to introduce the erklaren -
""^^^^^^^^ methodological dichotomy (von Wright, 1971). For Droysan the
aim of natural sciences is to explain and the aim of history is to under-
stand. When something is explained we also increase our understanding.
However, understanding involves the ability to empathize and is connected
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wich t„.e„«„„.uey
„he.eas explanation U not. xhe notion of Histori-
cal understanding rather than historical explanation goes baok to the
time of Descartes.
Gardiner (1959) identifies the Italian historian Gan^riastti
Vico (1668-17A4) as one who opposed the sci^ntif^PPUfaea n e ic approach advocated
by his vell-known predecessor. Descartes (1596-1650). vico rejected
the ^the^tically inspired Cartesian criterion of true knowledge.
Specifically he denied that clear and distinct concepts could be univer-
sally valid or applicable. Vico rejected abstract concepts of univer-
sal man; his studies were contextual and particularistic, and his
style literary rather than scientific.
Some writers (Gardiner, 1959; Berlin, 1976) consider Vico to
be the intellectual forefather of an approach to explanation in history
found in the works of R.G. Collingwood and Williajn Dray. A main
feature of explanation for Collingwood (1946) is empathy or to use his
phrase, "reenactnienf. In order to explain an event/action we must
see it as Caesar saw it. The explanation of Caesar's actions emerges
from the particular circumstances of Caesar's time. Generalizations
or covering laws like, given x A will do y, are not sought in this kind
of explanation.
Dray (1957) argues for a "rational explanation", the goal of
which is to show that the thing which was done, was done for the reasons
given (p. 124). a rational explanation requires a "calculation" of
reasons, where the calculation is similar to a process of appraisal.
Thus, the explanation of an action involves a demonstration that the
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action
..e app.„p.i«e
„. „ti„„al
.Hi„« eo ,i.e„ the p„tU.U.
circumstances.
The work of Connolly (1,74) on the notion of "contested con-
cepts"
.ay be viewed as an extension of Dray's argument that different
kinds of explanations l^ly different points of view. Por Dray an
explanation which refers to reasons Involves an agent's point of view
Connolly (1,M) argues that the concepts In an explanation need to
e,*race the various points of view a^ng those to which the explanation
is applied. To the extent that these points of view are not fully
reconciled, the concepts are tagged as "contested". Knight (1978)
review, the notion of contested concept and Its l„„llcatlons for psych-
ologlcal methodology.
The framing of an agent-relational perspective Is potentially
endless, however, the works of Wittgenstein, Anscombe and Winch must be
mentioned before the frame Is called complete. In his later work.
Philosophical TnvesMf^aflonn. Wittgenstein departed from strict referen-
tial meaning advocated by the Vienna Circle and sought to link meaning
to use. As Fogelln (1976) points out. meaning Is established by exam-
ining contingent facts of everyday life (p. 115).
Anscombe (1958)
,
In her book Intention , makes two points that
are relevant to the Introduction of an alternative point of view.
First, a behavior may have two descriptions; one description that is
amenable to causal analysis, the other which Is amenable to an agent-
relational analysis. Her point Is similar to Dray's about different
points of view. Second, she revived Aristotle's practical syllogism .
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An example would be.
A intends to bring about £. (Minor premise)
A considers that he cannot bring about punless he does a. (Major premise) ^
Therefore A sets himself to do a. (conclu-
sion; see von Wright, 1971, p. 96).
While the practical syllogism is not logically binding it is an important
part of teleological explanation and explanation in history and social
science (von Wright. 1971). The structure of the practical syllogism
is analogous to the structure of the covering law model of explanation.
The major premise would be the law-like statement, the minor premise
would be the antecedent condition and the conclusion parallels the explan-
andum. Indeed the practical syllogism may be seen as the model of
explanation in the sphere of human action.
The work of Winch (i.e., 1958, 1970) would emphasize the impor-
tance of embedding the practical syllogisms of Anscombe into a social
context. Furthermore, Winch (1958) argues that implicit and explicit
rules that participants follow render actions (e.g., actions contained
in a practical syllogism) intelligible. To the extent that observers
do not participate in a given context, observed behaviors and reasoning
patterns may appear irrational. However, the point of Winch, and the
agent-relational perspective being developed here, is that what appears
to be irrational may be quite reasonable to someone involved in the con-
text.
From Wittgenstein to Winch we have come full circle.
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Wittgenstein's later work Phii„= U4 , ,
• LhUosophlcal Investigations »^k„
usage base of leaning.
„ineh stresses the Importance ol Involve^nt
m a context. Not surprisingly („i„ch Is a scholar on Wittgenstein)
the two positions are co^U.entary. Participation In a social con-
text loiplles using concepts and vice versa.
n.ere are two inrportant aspects of the agent-relational per-
spective worth emphasizing. First, following Ansconi,e (1958) as well
as Colllngwood (1933. 1946). practical syllogls. or practical reasoning
is open ended and not binding In the way a logical syllogls. Is binding.
It see^ that the "force" of the practical syllogism arises out of the
social context which renders the chain of events, actions, reasons
intelligible. Ihls is the second point and is raised by Winch.
Social context with its attendant rules render the practical syllogism
intelligible and ultimately give it its "force".
Already a dark cloud is forming over the covering law model.
As discussed earlier, the efficaciousness of a scientific explanation
emerges for the Independence of the events In the model and the logical
relationship between the explanans and explanandum. However, as
indicated here, the force of the practical syllogism, the analogue of
the covering law model in the sphere of human action. Is socially
derived. More will be said about these points In subsequent sections.
Ihe open endedness of practical reasoning and importance of
social context are characteristic of a constructlvist's perspective
(Miller, Gallanter and Pribram. 1960; Neisser, 1967; Harre and Secord.
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explanation outlined in Figure 7 1 a.g /.I. According to Magoon (1977) one
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involve an account of .he social con.ext Indu.lns social
.eflni.lons
and rules. n,e nex. sec.lon Is a cr<M . .t critique of the covering law nodel
using an example of purposive behavior.
John Henry versus Conl. and Camphpll
The core of the covering law model is at.achlng cause .o
effect through hypotheses, geherall.ations or laws. Cook and Campbell,
C1975) as well as Campbell and Stanley (1966) apply the requirements of
this form of explanation to research in applied settings. John Henry
was a nineteenth century railroad construction worker whose actions are
the subject of speculation by Cook and Campbell.
The establishment of a causal explanation in this literature
is achieved by attending to four types of validity: Internal, external,
construe, and statistical conclusion. n,e elimination of various
"threats" to these four validities permits the researcher to rule out
rival plausible hypotheses. Later, an examlna.lon of .he threats to
internal validity will provide insights into the way the covering law
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model handles intentional concepts E«.h ^. ac type of validity functions to
maintain certain aspects of ^ho .t e causal connections in the explanation
(Cook and Campbell, 1975, p. 223).
Statistical conclusion iron^^..e validity concerns the statistical co-
variation of cause with effect
.
^ . Statistical analysis is considered
the ,a.e.eepe.
.o causal e:,la„a.,™.
,UHou,H
.a.Ueical evidence
13 no. 3u.acie„.
.„ es.a.naH
.Ha. A cause. B.
.His
.,pe o. ev.Cenca U
seen as necessary.
^.ea.s
.o s.a.is.lcal conclusion valldl.y Include
type I and II errors as well as .He error ra.e problem. Po.
.^.ailed
reviews Of
.hese Issues
.He reader Is referred
.o Kir. (1,72), Ueber-
man (19 71) and Coulson (1976).
Construct validity concerns tHe correc. labeling of cause A
and effect B. IHe labeling of the
.rea.^n. (cause) i„ the HawtHorne
expert^nt Is the co™.„ example given to illustrate construe, validity.
Music was provided for workers and .heir produc.ivi.y went up. Did
the .uslc cause
.He observed increase in produc.ivi.y or was i. due
.o
the attention given to the workers by the researchers? This is a
construct validation question. Threats to .his
.ype of valldl.y ste.
from singular measure^nt processes which cannot by then^elves rule out
irrelevancles. as well as, reactive difficulties such as evaluation
apprehension and experimenter expectancies. Much has been written on
construct validity; the reader is referred to Cronbach and Meehl, 1955;
Cronbach. 1971; Campbell and Flske, 1959; Messlck, 1975.
External validity refers to the validity with which a causal
relationship can be generalized across persons, settings and times.
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PopuUUon
.ea„U.o„ e«e« . „H.cH .He unUs of a„al...s
were ran.o.1, sa^.ed fro. the population.
^.ea.s
.o e«e™al
vauau,
.„.i..e
.He .a..o. po..Hle interaction, of varlaHXes sucH
as selection and maturation with the f.o.^ . ,treatment (see Campbell and Stan-
ley. 1966)
.
Close tie between Internal and external validity in
Campbell and Stanley (1966, Has dra™ some criticism f.om sucH writers
as BracHt and Glass (1968) and Snow (1974) . i,,ey discuss a notion
called ecological validity which empHasi.es natural variation and des-
criptive analysis as opposed to the controlled variation and inferen-
tial metHods advocated by Campbell and Stanley (1,66). and CooR and
Campbell (1975).
Finally, internal validity refers to the validity of an
Inference which leads to the stateir^nt that A caused B. internal
validity is the major concern because the demonstration of a causal
relationship among events is paramount in scientific explanation.
Campbell and Stanley (1966) remark.
Internal validity is the basic minimum
without which any experiment is uninter-
pretable
... Internal validity is the
sin qua non (p. 5, original emphasis).
The defense of causal explanation and ultimately the covering law model
is made on the territory of experimental validity, particularly inter-
nal validity. It is time to penetrate that territory.
In general the list of threats to each of the four validities
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provide, the researcher with a by which he or she rule out
Plausible rival hypotheses. Through this language „e co«unlcate and
criticize experimental findings. while this see^ llKe a reasonable
procedure, closer scrutiny o, these threats shows a way of talking
about hu^n behavior that Is at best peculiar. 1„ particular, this
shows up in the arena of Internal validity, the center stadium of scien-
tific explanation. In order to develop this point we trace the list
of threats to internal validity through the works of Campbell and Stan-
ley to Cook and Campbell.
Originally Campbell and Stanley list eight major threats to
the "internal" interpretation that A caused B. The more "external-
aspect of the interpretation that this A caused this B is a labeling
problem (see Cook and Campbell, 1975, p. 226). The internal threats
are well known and originally listed as:
1. History 5. Statistical regression
2. Maturation 6. Selection
3. Testing 7. Mortality
4. Instrumentation 8. Interactions with selection
For the sake of discussion we label this original list of threats as
"class A" threats. Approximately ten years later Cook and Campbell
(1975) extended the original list to include:
9. Ambiguity about the direction of causal inference
10. Diffusion or imitation of the treatment
11. Compensatory equalization of treatment
12. Compensatory rivalry
13. Resentful demoralization
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lA. Local history
(pp. 228-229)
^ese Six addUicnal threats a.e labeled 1„ the sequel as "class B"
threats. since these threats are less fa^Uar they are briefly
described below.
The exa^le given for threat #9 co.es fro. a hypothetical
correlational study In which It Is difficult to establish whether less
fore^ supervision causes higher productivity or higher productivity
causes less fore^ supervision. In ^y e:<perl.ents the direction
of causality Is clear fro,n the banner In which the Independent varia-
bles are applied and the dependent ^asures subsequently collected.
That Is. experl,.ents l,„ply a teinporal sequence whereas a correlational
Study often does not.
Threat #10 results from informational channels overlapping
and thereby confounding inferences which might be made about the
inrpact of the treatment. For example, evaluating the impact of an
instructional package about sex education for adolescents in a 5-week
follow up would be confounded if during that 5-week period the local
rock station ran a campaign against teenage pregnancies. Other mani-
festations of this threat are when participants in the treatment talk
to participants in the control. The New Jersey Negative Income Tax
Experiment faced this difficulty in their efforts to establish compara-
ble control groups (Rossi and Williams, 1972).
Threats 11-13 are similar. Concern for #11 stems from the
possibility that a worrisome administrator would compensate the control
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.„ .He presence o. .He
.ea.ene. On
.^e o.Her Hana resene.nX
-^rau.a.„n
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...^^^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^
^^^^^^^
Sroup are
.e.raK.a Heca.e
.He. are no. rece.v.ns. and pre.u.aHl,
benefiting frc,
.He
.rea.men..
Finally, a .hrea.
.ha. arises fro» local Hls.ory concerns
"Hat Happens a. a
...^
^^^^^
s.rategy Is .o randomize out .hese r.r^hit problems. However, the unit of
analysis (e.g., neighborhoods) may preclude eH,n<„ wliminating some possible
interpre.a.ions due
.o local history.
first step In .He analysls/crl.lque of In.ernal validity
la a general comparison of class A threats with class B
.hreats. All
Of .he class A
.hrea.s are el.Her experimenter controlled (3-6) or are
somehow external to the control of both the experimenter and subject
(1,2.7,8). For example, m the latter set. History Is a category for
all the extra or Incidental events which occur be.ween the pretest and
posttest. IHese events are seen as "everything else that happens",
and in that sense they are naturally occurring and outside of the con-
trol of the experimenter and participant. Effects due .o Hls.ory are
ruled out through randomization. It could be argued that mor.all.y
is a result of a par.lclpan.'s choice to leave the experiment and thus
under their control. However,
.he language used
.o discuss mor.all.y
excludes that interpretation. For example.
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aegSlltz. This Is a threat when aneffect
.nay be due to the different kindsof persons who dropped out of partlcuUrtreatment groups during the course of ane^erlment. (Cook and Campbell, 19?5,
T^^t is. mortality Is Interpreted In dispositional ter™ ("different
Mn^s of persons") where the disposition, which Is external to the per-
son, causes the attrition. Even If this last point Is not accepted
»ost elements of class A threats are subject to experimenter control
and are external to the participants In a way which contrasts sharply
With the class B threats.
An inspection of the two classes of i-hr-^o^i-ww Li r threats uncovers a
striking difference. Class B clearly emphasizes agency, relationship
and context, whereas class A does not. For example, "diffusion of
treatment" Is relational; subjects talk to each other. And 'tompen-
satory rivalry" Involves the notion of agency; John Henry Intended to
drive more spikes than the steam machine. Local history Involves the
particular context surrounding the phenomenon under study. Only
threat #9 (ambiguity about the direction of causal inference) seems
slightly different from the others in class B. However, a case could
be made for the relational aspect of this threat. It has been point-
ed out by Knight (1976) that the constructs of similarity and attraction
are relationally bound to each other. This creates a conceptual
dependency which makes it inappropriate to state "similarity causes
attraction" or "attraction causes similarity"
.
In the Cook and Campbell discussion of class B threats, the
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notions Of a.enc..
.eUt.on.Mp an. eontex. a.e „ea.e. a nagaUve
-y. That is. these notions a.e threats to causal explanation and itU therefore desi.ahle to eli^nate the. xhis is not surprising
ilven the tenets of the covering la„ ^,^1 of explanation. As dis-
cussed earlier the concept of intention as a cause violates the
requirement that cause and effect he logically distinct. An inten-
tion has »eanlng only insofar as it refers to a behavioral outcome
Which would be the effect of the intention. while it is usually
fruitful to fit pheno«„a into a scientific model, the way in which
this is accomplished through the class R t-hr-o.*-ii cn C B threats seems strained and
unnatural.
Let's examine the case of John Henry. Saretsky (1972)
describes a tall, brawny railroad pile driver that worked so hard to
out perform a steam drill that he died of over exertion. This is
the well known story of John Henry. Cook and Campbell (1975) cite
John Henry's efforts as an example of compensatory rivalry (threat
i?12, class B). However, the explanation of John Henry's actions in
"compensatory rivalry" terms weakens the possibility of a causal ex-
planation. In this situation we wish to attribute the outcome, B,
(greater number of spikes driven into the ground) to cause Al (human
effort) or cause A2 (machine effort). We need to eliminate the
possibility of compensatory rivalry in order to make a correct causal
inference. In spite of one's desire for a correct causal inference
it seems reasonable to argue that John Henry Intended to defeat the
steam spike driver. And to the extent that his intentions were framed
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Within ehe „„ge Ms aMU.Us. ™ asent-.eUtional explanation see.
-re app.op.iate than a causaX explanation which would seeU to eliminate
the Intentional terms.
A defense of the explanation by cause would separate the
"true" effect fro. the spurious effect resulting fro. intention. While
John Henry defeated the machine (intentional effect), the machine is
better than human labor (-true" effect). m this exan^le the spurious-
ness of the intentional effect stems from the fact that John Henry's
efforts far exceeded normal human efforts. Presumably most could not
Wield a hanger as well as John nor could John maintain his efforts; he
died.
However, the separation of intentional effect as spurious in
order to identify the true effect does not always make sense. For
example, in a case of teachers using the old teaching method versus the
teachers using the new teaching method, the intentional efforts by one
group of teachers may be far more important than the causal impact of
the program. In such a case the true effect would indeed be the conse-
quence of intentional effort. Ironically, the only real threat in the
John Henry example may be the threat to his job posed by the machine.
Finally, the language required to maintain a causal explana-
tion in the face of class B threats seems cumbersome. For example,
"It is also possible for reactive research
to result in real but uninterpretable
treatment effects, especially when persons
in these groups compare themselves to
others and guess how they are supposed to
behave (in many situations it is not
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difficult to guess what is desired
^n^''i^^^^ P^^^^P" education, o^ inindustrial organizations).
. . . iheproblem can best be avoided by makinghypotheses hard to guess (if there are
any;
,
by decreasing the general levelof reactivity in the experiment, or bydeliberately giving different hypothe-
ses to different respondents. (Cook
and Campbell, 1975, p. 2 43)
They go on to admit that these are only partial solutions, since inspite
of the researchers efforts, respondents are not passive. Still the
disturbing implication lingers that if one could somehow eliminate such
things as intention or reactivity a pristine causal explanation would
emerge. What is disturbing is an image of a completely non-reactive
person whose behavior is explained by causal notions.
The major argument in the critique of internal validity is
that it attempts to eliminate notions of agency, relationship and con-
text from the explanation of events. In the sphere of social action
(e.g.. John Henry) it seems more appropriate to use these concepts
than to eliminate them in order to meet the requirements of the cover-
ing law model. Furthermore, the implicit recognition of intentional
concepts (class B threats) generates a cumbersome language with dis-
turbing implications. The next section discusses the event-action
distinction.
Event or Action ?
There is no rule which categorizes an occurrence as an event
or an action. Indeed the same occurrence can be both; instead, the
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Ubel Of even, or acUon
.
(Coia„.„oo.. 1,33.
,,3^^
^^^^^ ^^^^^^^ ^^^^
von Wright, 1971; Connolly 1974^ a ^ ,^^y> ). As Dray (1957) has put it, the
two statements about the same thing,
1. A's reason for doing x was y
2. The cause of A's doing x was y,
differ in terms of their point of view. Statement one reflects an
agency point of view whereas statement two reflects the point of view
Of manipulator or predictor which involves such concepts as control
and detachment. Collingwood (1946) describes Caesar's crossing of
the Rubicon in terms of, a) his physical movements, and b) his defi-
ance Of Republican law. The second description requires reference
to Caesar's intentions and takes the view point of agency through a
"reenactment" process. The differences between event and action
may be outlined as follows:
TABLE 8.1
Event or Action
Event Action
^^^^i^ti^^ P°int of view: Agent-relationalFeatures: Features:
1. Bound to physical 1. Bound to purposive concepts
movements
2. Objective and 2. Intersubjective and ambigu-
enumerative ous
3. Conceptually dis- 3. Conceptually dependent
tinct
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Na.«aU..
..e
..„e.„ces
.e.een eve.
ences between
.he two
.o^els of e:,U„atlon outUnea i„ n^ute 7 1
With these distinctions in ^nd let-s
.eexe^ne
.ohn Henry's
defeat of the ^ohine.
„as it an event o. an action. if u wete
an event out perspective would he predictive. Because it is UUely
that
.ohn. out Of a desire to .eep his Joh. hehaved (acted, in an ex-
pected way. we are ahle to ^.e a prediction in this particular case
However, as covering law theorists, we would seeU generalisations to
other cases and thus would seek to ^nipulate the situation in order
to »ake other successful predictions. Furthermore our description
Of his behavior would be tied to physical movements; any reference to
intentions as cause would violate the requirement that cause and
effect be logically distinct. To the extent that a predictive point
of View would lead us into the manipulation of other jobs and to the
extent that the description could not legitimately refer to intentions,
John Henry's defeat of the machine as an event is unsatisfactory.
Incidentally the "manipulation" of jobs would be acceptable if it took
place within an agent-relational perspective rather than a predictive
perspective.
By treating the defeat of the machine as an action an agent-
relational perspective is implied. The explanation of his actions
would not emerge out of the specification of antecedent conditions and
general laws. Instead, through an agent-relational perspective,
intentions would be sought. Intentions would be soug^t:by questioning
the agent, John Henry, and those around him. However, if the agent
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ions
is no l„n,e. aXiv.. as the case here and in Historical Investi^at
intentions wouia be bracketed through a
..reenact^nf process described
by Colli„g„ood (1946, and Dray (1,57) . ^e questioning process is
mtersubjectlve and contains exiguities with i^ortant i^lications
that are discussed in the next section. Thus to understand aohn Henry
action „e view hi. as an agent acting according to plans, intentions and
purposes. IWo strategies were suggested to "observe" the intentions,
a) reenact.e„t and b) questioning. Due to the intersubjective nature
of the questioning process and the conceptual relationship between
intention and behavior (von Wrieht i-u^wo w gn , ly/l) the perspective on John Henry's
actions is more agent-relational than it is predictive.
Before considering an exantple where the occurrence is better
described as an event, a brief connnent on intention is necessary. Fre-
quently an agent acts without any awareness of an intention. This
does not present a serious difficulty for the agent-relational perspect-
ive. As Dray (1957) argues many actions are found to be perfectly
intelligible by those involved in the context. In such cases the
action is in a state of "explanatory equilibrium" (p. 125); it does not
need an explanation. Here the concept of intentionality is not needed.
Intention becomes a vestige; it still exists but no longer has a mean-
ingful function. It is plausible that the societal structure in
highly integrated communities could completely displace intentionality
from the individual level to the social level. However as soon as an
individual's action is less than perfectly intelligible (in less inte-
grated communities) a need for an explanation arises. The intentional
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vestige Is revived. To reoain ^ ig explanatory equilibrium we seek the
asents reasona lor acting 1„ tHe manner o.servea. B. diacoverlng tHe
agent's calculations, the action hecomea Intelllglhle and explanatory
e,ulllhrlum reeatahllahed. Xo go lurther Into the nature ol Intention
would require a review of
.reudlan notions, which Is clearly
.eyond
the purposes of this discussion u~a l . However, two Incidental points are
worth noting 1„ passing that castle.
First, the ellcltatlon of reasons and Intentions In psycho-
therapy occurs m situations where the "explanatory equilibrium" has
been disturbed. Second, the restoration of psychological equilibrium
as wall as explanatory equilibrium Is accomplished by considerable
attention to social context. Including personal histories.
"Jones crossed the street"; event or action? Under ordinary
drcu^tances we would classify this as an action and explain It by
referring to the tobacco store across the street and the Intention of
Jones to purchase a new pipe (see Peters. 1958 for additional discussion
of this exa^le)
.
However these are not ordinary times and it may be
that Jones is under threat from a terrorist gang and has been forced to
cross the street. The event "crossing the street" is conceptually
distinct from the cause "terrorist threat". Although the terrorists
may have a purpose in mind when they forced Jones to cross the street,
the relationship between the presumed cause and effect Is literally
physical (coercive) and not directly determined by their purposes.
Furthermore it Is quite meaningful to describe "Jones crossing the
street" in terms of physical movements rather than in intentional terms.
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Although some aspects ofcioFct-t r this example nlarc^ t-u^ ^FJ-e P a e the occurrence into the
even, caceso.. o.He.s
.„
^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^
the dee„.p...„
^^^^^^^^
^^^^^ ^^^^
agent-relational. That ie^a is, because Jones understands that the people
with whom he is dealing with are terrorists fas nn .c Us opposed to actors) he
Choose. „o.
.o .es.. ehe..
...eats. ehls case
.He po.n. o. view
on
.ones- behavio.
,e a.en.-.ela.ional
..ou^h
.He e:,Xana..on is
causal.
A case In which .he ev*>Ti*- "tvent, Jones crossed
.he s.ree.", implies
a predictive poln. of view as well as a causal explana.lon. Is .he
following. suppose we observe Jones "hopping spasmodically across
the street". clearly this™ of crossing the s.ree. doesn'. see.
to fit ordinary expec.a.lons for s.ree. crossing behavior. Perhaps
Jones is listening to a transistor radio as he walks along the sidewalk.
The newscaster is reading the lottery number for the million dollar Lo.o
Canada prize. I. is Jones' nu^er and he hops Joyously, though spas-
modically, across the street. However, it may be that the news of the
Win proved
.00 much for Jones and caused a hemorrhage in the mo.or co-
ordina.lon cen.er in his brain. Tke hemorrhage causes him .0 «,i.ch
and move randomly, and by coincidence
.0 move across .he s.reet. I„
.his case, as before, a description of his physical movements is mean-
ingful and his movements are conceptually distinct from the cause of
these movements. Moreover his behavior is predictable from this par-
ticular kind of hemorrhage. Finally It would not be meaningful to
take an agent-relational point of view towards .he even. "Jones crossed
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the street" In this examole Th-^ , vnp . That Is the relationship between Jones'
behavior and the cause (he^rrhage) is entirely causal.
Before leaving this set of exa^^les it is t^ortant to note
that an agent-relational perspective toward e^lalning actions does not
exclude prediction and cause. m the case of an. occurrence which
involves physical
.ove^nts there are always causes, m the covering
law
.odel sense, of that
.ove^nt. However, in ^ny cases it is „ore
appropriate to descrihe the action in ter»s of purpose, intention and
so forth rather than attesting to find efficient causes (Maclntyre.
1971)
.
Nevertheless the efficient causes are always present and
necessary in a cosElete description. However, they are not suffic-
ient; indeed the concepts associated with the agent-relational per-
spective provide the sufficiency and render the description ^aningful
(Peters. 1958). m the last section "question asking" as a funda-
tnental part of the agent-relational perspective is examined.
Asking a Question
There is a well known anecdote about a famous philosopher.
From her deathbed she sat up to speak for the last time, "What are the
answers?" Her companion, also a philosopher of reputation, responded,
"What are the questions?" Ihere is little doubt that the friend's
response had an impact on the dying philosopher, though it is difficult
to know the exact nature of the impact. The point of the story is
not that one should establish appropriate questions before seeking
answers, although that would certainly be important to do. Instead
Ill
the point U that th. ,uesUons „e as. o£ otHe. „a. .Hin. an. even
shaue up.
.He.,
.oncep^a.
,.3.e„„, „eU as o..
,„esUon asU
ing is interactive and a significant part of social dialogue. ^
Heidegger remarked. "We
- mankind - are a conversation." m the dis-
cussion that follows „e explore this interactive aspect of question ask-
ing as well as how the particular question influences the answers we
seek.
In a 1969 Request for Proposal (RFP) the Office of Economic
Opportunity (OEO) asked the following question,
"Does the cognitive and affective develop-
ment of primary-grade school children whohave had Head Start experience differ
significantly from that of comparable
children who have not had such experience?"
The Westlnghouse Learning Corporation of Ohio was awarded the contract
and set out to answer this question. A short year later an answer was
filed which touched off an emotional and technical debate that has last-
ed for a decade. The tenor of the Ohio Westinghouse report on Head
Start was negative. However, advocates of the program claimed that
OEO asked the wrong question. Because the individual Head Start pro-
grams were quite different it would have been more useful to know which
individual programs were successful rather than whether or not Head
Start as a generic compensatory educational program was successful.
Caplan and Nelson (1973) also emphasize the importance of
attending to the level at which the question is asked, though in a
slightly different context than the preceding example. They argue
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that ps^cHolosicaX
„se„eH „„
.o.,.,
^ ^^^^^ ^^^^
ward pe„„„ centered e^cplanatlon.
.athe.
.,a„
explanations. Thel. a.st conce™ u „Uh p.oble. deflnUion.
First what Is done about a problemdepends on how It is defined. The way
tuTlltt "r"^" detenS^er'he at empts at remediation - or even
whether such attempts wlU be made - bysuggesting both the foci and the technL
of intervention-^ by rulmfsSr
nalX"arisr°^""""^^
Problem definition and the way a question Is framed are complimentary
processes. T.e question that one asks exposes the level of problem
definition that one is working at, whether or not that level is explic-
it. Furthermore, the explication of level of problem definition
determines the questions that will be asked. TH. darker side of their
thesis points out that the requirements of the covering law model
channel the problem definition to the person centered explanation,
mis limits the inferential potential of the findings which in turn
influences the kinds of programs that are established to meet various
social needs. This is a variation of Kaplan's (1964) Law of the
Instrument: give a small boy a hammer, and suddenly he discovers that
everything needs hammering.
Gardiner (1961) makes a more general point concerning the
researchers responsibility to frame the research question correctly.
He says.
Many, apparently Insoluble, problems
arise because of the indefiniteness
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n-r 1-r.
''^'^^f^'^ce to any particular context
aa.di„a.. U.e Caplan an. Helson. po.„.s ou.
..a. a question, such as
•^^y did World war I oocurr. 1. answerable on different levels.
1. the level of Individual purposes
2. the level of national policies
3. the level of economic trends.
Furthermore, Gardiner (1961) operates within the causal framework im-
plied by the covering law model by arguing that the different levels of
questions and answers are actually different levels of generality
achieved by the explanation. Caplan and Nelson (1973) are less ex-
plicit about their acceptance or rejection of a covering law type
explanation. l^ese points may be subsumed under a concern for exter-
nal validity. That is, they reflect a concern for the extent to
which the results generalize to the population embodied in the question.
While all of these examples concern the relationship between
the question and explanation, these relationships are discussed within
the framework of the covering law model of explanation. Furthermore
the questions in the examples discussed above were research questions
asked by the investigators, as opposed to questions asked by the resear-
cher of the participants in the study. The next set of examples move
the questioning process into the agent-relational framework by consider-
ing an interesting argument by Buss (1977) in an unpublished manuscript
lU
on causes s„d reasons in attribution theory Here we move Into the
under-emphasized interactive asoerf „f ,kp ct of the researcher-researched ques-
tioning process, a fundamental part of data collection.
Buss (1977) argues that the actor-observer attributional
differences (.ones and Nisbett. 1,72) are a result of the Mnd of
explanation required by "answerees" (actors or observers) to respond to
the questions.
.ones and Nisbett (1972) present evidence that actors
and Observers give different causal attributions, situational and dis-
positional respectively. Buss (1977) argues that a question put to an
actor about their own behavior calls for a qualitatively different Uind
of explanation.
They [the actors] are attempting to
provide a rationale for their actions.
They are attempting to make their
actions Intelligible to others. In
short, they find themselves In such a
situation where a reason, and not a
causal, explanation of their actions
are required. (Buss, 1977, p. 17,
original emphasis)
As Buss points out this is a conceptual rather than empirical criticism
of the actor-observer difference. This conceptual disagreement stems
from the fact that Buss allows for a second kind of explanation, reason
explanation, whereas for Jones and Nisbett the actor and observer explan-
atlons are both causal.
This example Illustrates a case In which the Interaction of
the content of a question with the person questioned generates an explan-
ation which is (and must be) logically different from a causal explana-
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tlcn. Moreover, certain attribution studies cited by Buss overlooked
this category shift and were subject to (Justifiable) crltlcls. on that
basis. Thus to ask so^one to explain their actions/behavior Is to
ask a ,uestlon about the reasons (I.e.. Intentions, plans, etc.) for
their actions, rather than a question about the causes of their beha-
vior.
On the basis of this
-conceptual finding" Buss (1977) develops
a Conversion Model of research in the social sciences. The role of
the researcher would be to convert causes to reasons through a self-
reflective process at the individual level (e.g., psychotheraphy) and
the social level (e.g.. political involvexnent)
. Clearly his argument
moves the explanatory point of view from one which seeks causes to one
which seeks reasons. Moreover, this latter point of view is similar,
if not identical, to the second type of explanation (agent-relational)
discussed here. Next we look closer at the questioning process
within an agent-relational point of view.
Question asking is. ipso facto, an interactive process. More-
over, the request for information is no longer easily carried out by
the would be questioner. Difficulties are encountered at nearly every
level; a trend which may be interpreted as compatible with an agent-
relational perspective. For example, test ethic committees (see,
Petersen and Novick, 1975; Novick and Ellis. 1975; AERA Proceedings.
1978) are studying the complicated issues surrounding the meaning and
use of measurements (Messick, 1975). The California court case con-
cerning the disproportionate number of minority children in educably
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rs
a
ties. school psychologists
.ust be „uch „ore explicit about how a
test score is used before a chiiH vL^cj-m n d can be tested T^^*--t jc a. Testing is one kind
of request for information.
Employment applications may not ask for race, sex or age
because these are ruled irrelevant to qualifications for employment.
social psychologists must obtain informed consent before asking research
participants to state beliefs and opinions. Even survey researche
need to be sensitive to the type of questions they ask, else risk
painful slam-the-door-on-the-foot incident.
A closer look at the interactive aspect of question asking
shows a dependency between the questioner and the answers obtained which
beguiles causal analysis. However, an agent-relational perspective
recognizes this dependency of the "factual events" established through
questioning. Within the framework of a relationship (e.g., interper-
sonal, cooperative, superordinate-subordinate) the question-answer pro-
cess engenders a self-reflective thought process which infuses the
interaction with a certain kind of ambiguity. Hampshire (1975) says,
When a person, thinking about a question,
still does not know what he thinks about
it, he may be told by a friend that what
he thinks is so-and-so and, being told,
he may agree that this is what he thinks,
and even that this is what he had been
thinking, though he did not admit it to
himself.
... Perhaps the confusion in his
' mind cannot be conveyed by any simple
account of what he believes: perhaps only
a reproduction of the complexity and con-
fusion will be accurate (p. 123).
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a^iguuy U not eli^nated; hc„eve.. the maintenance of an Inter-
action would foste. stable and
.eanlngful Interpretations of the ques-
tions and answers. ^is notion of a^i.ult. created the Interaction
between a questioner and ,uestlonee he further Illustrated with .ore
detail fro. Hampshire's philosophical arg^ent and a study fro. psychol-
ogy.
,
Stuart Hampshire In an essay titled "Some Difficulties In
Knowing" (in Science and Inq uiry) Illustrates the Impact of a question
such as "What Is your attitude toward this?" (e.g., going to Italy),
when the question calls for a response. His first point Is that the
process of thought is both a coming to be sure or to know that something
is to be the case and a process of making It the case. Second, the
raising of a question changes the agent's state of mind.
Hampshire says,
"What is your attitude to this?" (e.g., going
to Italy) — places me in an ambiguous position
a position of facing both ways; I am confronted
with the need to confront the facts, as they
already are, and with the need to make a decision,for I may dissociate myself, with a second-level
desire or attitude, from the desire or attitude
which I find that I already have. The request
for information forces me into this position of
active self-consciousness; and the asking of
the question may change the facts by engendering
this self-consciousness (p. 44).
An empirical example of Hampshire's argument is found in a
study of couple relationships by Rubin and Mitchell (1976). Two exam-
ples of the questions they asked are:
1. Who would you say is more involved in your
relationship - ( ) or you?
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or you? ' '^°8">'" " ( )
Fro„ a PC.
^^^^ ^^^^
process of as.ln,
,.estio„s fre,u.„Uy changes the relationship of the
couple participants.
ou.^m'^ """'^f^^' questions raisedq estions xn the participants' own minds
tlTu"''/'' ''^''"^^ ^^^^^ relationshiphat had not previously been raised. inorder to answer the questions, the partici-pants had to engage in new sorts of thinking
and sometimes in searching examinations of''
Clearly from this example of Hampshire's argument, we can see that the
actual process of asking a question alters what were the facts of the
situation before the question was asked. This point presents diffi-
culties for causal explanation which necessarily assumes that the facts
are obtained by methods independent of the facts themselves.
Often current research practice seeks to eliminate the impact
of relationship because it violates fundamental assumptions of causal
explanation, (e.g.. Cook and Campbell, 1975). The researcher seeks
an impartial, unbiased vantage point and often accomplishes this with a
detached, professional facade. However, such a stance frequently
implies a superordinate-subordinate relationship with the people in the
study (Ingle, 1977) which in turn influences the conclusions about
their actions.
The point here is not to try to eliminate the effects of the
f
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relationship
...ough
.ore e^e.l.ental manipulations
.u.
.athe.
.e expllc
it about the nature of the relationship and view the conclusions accord-
ingly. Moreover, hy explicating the relationship, the researcher
.ay
consciously reject a particular
relationship (e.g., superor.inate
subordinate) and see. another kind of relationship (e.g.. cooperative)
within Which to as. questions and conduct the research.
.or example
When questions are asked within the framework of an interpersonal relat-
ionship the impact of the questions is mutually felt. That is, any
Changes that occur as a result of the questions effect both parties.
This kind of argument is found in the works of MacMurray (1961) and
Friere (1970)
.
Thus question asking becomes a constructive nro..... in-
stead of a means of establishing factual events about an existing real-
ity.
The arguments to this point have indicated that an inherent
ambiguity in the question asking process is an important factor in ex-
planation despite the fact that it threatens the validity of causal
explanation. Furthermore, a successful embrace of this ambiguity re-
quires adoption of an agent-relational point of view. In the consid-
eration of the relationship between the questioner and questionee, issues
of a social philosophical nature are inevitable. For example, a
causal approach which seeks to eliminate dependencies associated with
relationships and also involves manipulation of the environment and con-
trol of rewards implicitly recapitulates relationships of, for example
large industrial corporations. Thus, for the industrial manager who
controls the environment and rewards, an ejcperimental approach may be
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appropriate. However i-i,^c , the causal analysis of social program ,ay notbe appropriate when they embody different klnH» f ,J ii i ds of relationships than
experimental relationshipsMPS. For example, it may not be appropriate
-
evaluate the success of a cooperative business with experimental
methods because the kinds of relationships involved in each differ
TO be sensitive to actual and potential research relationships is to
adopt an agent-relational perspective Th. k- •F c . e ambiguity in the ques-
tlonmg process cannot be resolved, instead the ambiguity is e„.raced
through the maintenance of an interaction. Ihe interaction may be
labeled as a certain kind of relationship (superordinate - subordinate
cooperative), and within this framework the agents foster stable and
'
meaningful Interpretations of their questions and answers.
In this section we have considered one of the central activi-
ties of research; asking questions. The initial examples illustrated
the impact of the question on the answers sought. THe subsequent
examples attempted to show that the process of asking a question of
another person moves the researcher into an explanatory framework which
is more agent-relational than causal. That is the "events" gathered
by the question asking process in order to build an explanation are not
independent of the questioner. ^is kind of dependence is related to
the dependence discussed in the section on event and action. That is.
John Henry's intentions are not independent of his behavior, nor are
his intentions independent of his relationship with the researcher who
brought in the machine.
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Recapitulation
Earlier themes were:
1.
ca^egori'e: of''°'T
°' ^^^^ broad
logical
^^l^ation: causal and teleo-
2. ^ausal explanation (covering law model) domin-ates the natural and social sciences.
^'
cri'l^'''^/''J°''' ^^^P^^^tive components ofausal and teleological explanation, are alter-nate descriptions of the same occurrence.
4. The self-reflective process engendered by thequestion asking process creates an inherent
ambiguity.
5. To choose an explanatory model is to choose apoint of view, e.g., teleological -v agent-
relational.
Maclntyre (1973) presents a series of short examples which illustrate
two problem areas in the traditional model of explanation.
-^ese areas
are: (a) ability to predict, and (b) characterization of the actions of
others; this is the recapitulation.
Maclntyre (1973) illustrates the limitations and indetermin-
acy in prediction by examining the decisions made during a poker game.
He says.
The first of these [limitations] derives from
that element in the belief of agents which
Involves beliefs about the beliefs of other
agents, including beliefs about the beliefs
of others about their own beliefs and actions.
... Secondly, there is the familiar phenome-
non of the self-confirming or self-disconfinn-
ing prediction - i.e., the prediction whose
chances of truth or falsity are changed by the
act of making or publishing it. (p. 330)
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The point is that it is not possible for one agent to li^.
..e possi-
bilities that
.ay be opened up by the reflections of the other agent
Regularities (generalizations)
.ay be observed in .ore con^licated
interactions, however, recognition that the regularities have been ob-
served may in turn change the interaction tkj-nterac . Thus new, unexpected
"regularities" are created.
Maclntyre (1973) argues that the characterization of the
actions of others is an interactive and interpretative process. The
example that he uses is the expression of resentment. Imagine that
a friendly colleague gave your recently published book a mediocre
review. You know that he particularly prizes an expected invitation
to the dean's forthcoming party; that he loves to eat a certain rare
fruit; that he strongly desires that a resolution of his should be
passed at a faculty meeting. You may express your resentment towards
him through all or any of these actions: intercepting his mail; buy-
ing up the entire stock of rare fruit for the season; voting against
him at the faculty meeting; or by a more direct action such as knock-
ing him down. On the other hand, you may express your resentment
towards him by befriending a third person whose book he also reviewed
hostilely. Or you may do any of these actions without being in the
least motivated by resentment. The conclusion that Maclntyre draws
is that knowledge derived from the observation of overt behavior may
not accurately characterize the action.
These two illustrations of the limitations of causal
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explanation move the re«?PaT-oK^^ *se rcher fr™ a predictive point of view to an
asent-reUtlonal point of view. x„.,..,
generalizations
Which are Invulnerable to upsets ste»lns fro„ the l^llcatlons of
agency for prediction and the characterization of action, the research-
er enters Into an explicit relationship with the participants. The
particular context of the relationship and the maintenance of Inter-
action supports the various rational explanations given. if the con-
text and interactions change then the efficaciousness of the explanation
given would need to be reexa^ned.
^,aclntyres (1973) conclusion is
that the explanations of actions given by a social scientist face the
sa^e limitations as the explanations of that action given by a lay per-
son.
Coda
Chapters VII and VIII traced the development of two explana-
tory traditions; one is currently followed in many areas of social
science, while the other is debated in political science, philosophy
and history. These discussions have indicated that an agent-relation-
al point of view is a more meaningful approach to explaining occurrences
in the sphere of human affairs. The limitations associated with a
predictive point of view stem from (a) the nature of the elements of the
explanation (event or action)
,
(b) the independence-dependence of these
elements in the explanation, and (c) the consequent difficulties which
the predictive point of view has in characterizing such occurrences as
John Henry's defeat of the machine and Jones crossing the street.
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nnall. a consideration o,
.He ,nesUo„ aa.ing process also supported
an agent-interactive point of view.
To be true to Ouroboros. we attempt to co^ full circle
T^e thesis began with a study of issues and new procedures in ti,ne
series analysis. it is appropriate to end with so.e speculations on
how a time series design could fif-i t t into an agent-relational point of
view.
The context for these closing exa^les is a classroom. A
teacher is examining a student's behavior/actions over time. A
series is plotted; what the student does is transformed into events
for graphing purposes. This practice would follow the tenets of the
covering law model of explanation. Perhaps a treatment would inter-
rupt the sequence and its impact studied through the analytical proce-
dures outlined in chapters III and IV. Concurrent with these data
the teacher would record descriptive dialogues with the student about
the studentb behavior at each time point. These dialogues would be
relational and recognize the interactive aspect of characterizing
actions. The pattern of these dialogues would be compared to the
trends observed in the plotted behavioral events. For example, one
might compare the pattern of agreements in the dialogue about the
action descriptions with frequency of the behavioral events. Perhaps,
in a given context it would be reasonable to expect that the incidences
of descriptive agreements would increase as the frequency of the
behavioral event decreased over time. Also such a procedure would
meet some of the requirements of "thick description" called for in
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ethnology (Wilson, 1977) and ^T, .77) in constructivistic research (Magoon, 1977)
A
-re interactively con^lex utilisation of a ti:. series
design would require the teacher and fh- , .t e student to plot their own behav
as wen as the hehavlor o. the other. ^o^ ol series <
be Obtained. Por example, one plot ^ght he the teacher's self-
-tlns Of the amount of encoura.e^nt given to the student and a con-
co^ltant rating of the student's attention. si.lUrl.. the student
would self-rate the extent to which the. are pacing attention and rate
their perceptions of the amount of encouragement they are getting from
the teacher. ^e pairs of series could be compared and provide a
basis for dialogue. If the simultaneous self-other rating proved too
cumbersome It would be possible to obtain the two sets of curves through
peer ratings. That is. a friend of the student would make the atten-
tion-encouragement ratings and a colleague of the teacher would make
Similar attention-encourage„.nt ratings. ihe ratings could be done
during classroom times or made from video tapes of the classroom. The
selection of a friend and colleague to do the ratings would help main-
tain a relational point of view.
We have come full circle though passing time, at least, ensures
that „e have moved. Robert Frost ended a poem about a walk in a garden
with,
"I end not far from my going forth."
APPENDIX A
Covariance between e and e
n n+k
n+1
-n+k - ""n+k-i +
From [A.IJ and [A. 2] the covariance of e and e isn n+1 "
^<Vn+l> ' ^[%(Pen^^„+i>3
= PE(e„^) + E(e„c_^^^)
Errors are uncorrelated with previous observations, hence,
^<Vn+l> =
From [A.ll and tA.3] the covariance of e and e Isn n+2
^<Vn+2> =^^(PVl^
= P^a2 using the previous result.
From [A.l] and [A. 4] the covariance of e and e is
n n+k
rewrite e^_^j^_^ as e^ through k-1 recursive substitutions, yielding pCp^'^e )
k n
md hence,
E(p^e e ) = p^a2
n
k
, k
n%'
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stationaruy re,ul.e.e„t that |p|<l
.elated to the fact
that the lagged covarlancea in the series Is a power function of the lagU is Clear that if |p| „ere greater than one the covarlances at higher
lags would quickly become very large.
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